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ABSTRACT
I examine the costs and benefits to the issuer of hiring an IPO auditor specialist in the U.S.
Initial Public Offerings market. I quantify IPO auditor expertise at the market share level and the
market concentration level and then I investigate the audit fees of IPO audit expertise and the issuer
underpricing in the U.S. IPO market. I find that there are significant fee premiums when an audit
firm is a national IPO audit specialist and when an audit office is a city IPO audit specialist. I also
find that IPO specialist auditors reduce first-day issuer underpricing. These results are robust to
controlling for extant endogeneity with respect to choice of auditor. This paper contributes to both
the auditor specialization literature and the IPO literature by investigating IPO audit specialization.
This study also provides useful information to IPO market participants, such as issuers, investors,
auditors, and regulators.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
I investigate the IPO expertise of audit firms and audit offices in the U.S. Initial Public
Offerings (IPO) market when audit firms and audit offices gain experience in the U.S. IPO audit
market as measured by their IPO market share level and IPO market concentration level. I then
examine the costs and benefits to the issuer of hiring an IPO auditor specialist. Specifically, I
investigate whether IPO specialist auditors earn higher fees and whether issuers that use an IPO
specialist auditor exhibit lower first-day underpricing.
In the IPO market, the auditor’s role as an information intermediary is of paramount
importance because a high degree of information asymmetry exists between managers and
potential investors in the IPO setting (Leland and Pyle 1977). On the one hand, management has
an incentive to manage financial information to demonstrate stronger financial performance in
order to increase offering prices (Teoh, Wong, and Rao 1998) . On the other hand, potential
investors mainly obtain information about the firm from the offering prospectus because there is
often little publically available information about private entities. As the degree of information
asymmetry increases, the demand for high quality audits significantly increases because high
quality audits provide independent assurance of the credibility of accounting information,
improving resource allocation and contracting efficiency (DeFond and Zhang 2014).
For auditors, IPO audits are unique engagements which differ drastically from subsequent
regular audits. Auditors are required to make sure that financial statements are audited for up to
three years prior to the IPO, issue a comfort letter for underwriters, and aid first time registrants in
applying rules and interpretations. In addition, firms raising capital in the equity markets for the
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first time are less likely to have well-developed accounting systems and procedures in place
necessary to comply with SEC requirements. Thus, through more experience conducting IPO
audits, IPO specialized auditors should be able to develop a deeper understanding of how to
successfully conduct IPO audits, and become experts in the unique set of requirements and
expectations required of private companies transforming into public companies.
Accordingly, investigating whether IPO specialized auditors earn higher audit fees should
be of interest to client firms and potential investors because higher audit fees indicate a
combination of audit effort and expected losses from litigation (Simunic 1980). The Simunic
(1980) framework suggests that if IPO specialized auditors earn a fee premium, it means that IPO
specialized auditors exert more effort and/or IPO specialized auditors incorporate expected future
litigation losses into audit fees.
To extend Simunic’s framework to IPO specialist fee premiums, I argue that IPO clients
may value IPO specialized auditor expertise because this expertise should help to mitigate the high
degree of information asymmetry between issuers and investors in the IPO market. As such,
auditors’ IPO expertise should help to reduce first-day underpricing which increases IPO proceeds
to the firm. Given that a successful IPO can yield substantial proceeds for an issuer, IPO issuers
should be willing to pay higher audit fees to IPO specialist auditors.
A better understanding of auditor specialization in the IPO market should also be of interest
to governing bodies including the United States Congress and the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB). In response to burdensome regulations for the IPO process leading to
IPO activities being well below historical levels, the United States House of Representatives
passed the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act) on March 8, 2012 (Dambra, Field,
and Gustafson 2015). The JOBS Act makes it easier for smaller firms to go public by reducing the
2

regulatory burden of these firms seeking to raise equity capital. For example, emerging growth
companies (EGCs; firms with less than $1 billion in annual revenues) are exempt under the JOBS
Act from the requirement of an auditor to attest to the effectiveness of the company's internal
controls over financial reporting. While this exemption should have the effect of increasing the
number of small firms that go public, it may also increase the number of risky small firms that go
public, as well as increase the risk of audit failure because the effectiveness of internal controls is
a part of an integrated audit.
As a result of this internal control exemption, auditors will likely have to spend more time
performing substantive tests. Evidence that IPO specialized auditors earn higher audit fees due to
increased audit effort, increased risk premium, and/or increased IPO expertise would be consistent
with internal control exemptions being less of a concern for clients with IPO specialized auditors.
This will be beneficial information to regulators attempting to set the appropriate level of IPO
regulatory requirements to promote IPO activities while protecting investors from risky firms
going public. Additionally, in order to further improve financial reporting quality and protect
investors in smaller IPO firms, the PCAOB, as an oversight body of auditors, could choose to
focus more of their attention on clients with non-IPO specialist auditors in the course of their
inspections.
As a result of smaller firms having access to the capital markets through reduced regulatory
burden, smaller audit firms may play a larger future role in the IPO market and choose to specialize
in this market.1 In the U.S. IPO market, there is an increasing trend in the percentage of IPOs
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Prior literature suggests smaller auditors are increasing their services in a variety of ways. Louis
(2005) provides evidence that Non-Big N firms deliver better M&A advisory services. Boone,
Khurana, and Raman (2010) document that audit quality is no different between Big N and second
tier auditors after SOX. Chang, Cheng, and Reichelt (2010) find a relatively more positive market
3

audited by both mid-size and small audit firms (Treasury 2008). Additionally, Marcum LLP, stated
in response to having conducted the most IPO audits through the first three quarters of 2015 by a
non-Big 4 auditor that 34 percent of IPOs in 2015 were audited by non-Big 4 firms which
“highlights the growing notion that a company need not engage a Big 4 firm to complete an IPO”
(Marcum LLP 2015). This trend indicates that mid-size and small size auditors may also be able
to become IPO audit specialists by auditing a large number of IPO clients and obtaining experience
and knowledge of accounting rules specific to IPO audits. As a result of this changing perception
of non-Big 4 auditors in the IPO market, I argue that it is important to examine audit specialization,
regardless of auditor size, in the IPO market and the costs and the benefits of IPO specialist
auditors.
I define IPO specialization in terms of the audit firm and the audit offices’ IPO market
share level (definition 1) based on audit fees following the framework in Francis, Reichelt, and
Wang (2005). I also use IPO market concentration levels (definition 2) based on the proportion of
IPO audit fees over total audit fees following the framework in Gramling and Stone (2001). I then
examine the association between audit fees and auditor IPO specialization to investigate whether
IPO specialist auditors differentiate themselves from other auditors and earn a fee premium. I also
examine whether the use of an IPO audit specialist leads to lower levels of first-day issuer
underpricing. To address the endogeneity issue in client’s choice of an auditor, I use the propensity
score matching method in addition to my multivariate analysis.

reaction to clients switching from a Big4 to a smaller third tier auditor after SOX. Bills and
Stephens (2016) argue that small audit firms play a significant role in audit competition because
the market share distance from small audit firm competitors has a greater effect on the Big 4's audit
fees than distances from other Big 4 competitors.
4

I find that Ernst & Young LLP is the national IPO specialist for eight out of 14 years and
that Big 4 audit offices are 93% of the city IPO specialists when using IPO market share level
based measure on audit fees. In contrast, when I use IPO market concentration level based on the
proportion of IPO audit fees over total audit fees, I find that the national IPO specialist audit firms
for each year are mostly non-Big 4 audit firms and that Big 4 audit offices are 87% of the city IPO
specialists.
I find a significant fee premium of 78% with national IPO specialist audit firms and 141%
with city IPO specialist audit offices using the IPO market share level measure. There is an even
higher fee premium of 272% with national IPO specialist audit firms and of 173% with city IPO
specialist audit offices using the IPO market concentration level.2 I also find evidence that the use
of an IPO specialist auditor is associated with lower subsequent first-day issuer underpricing; the
coefficients on IPO specialist auditor are negative and significant and result in, on average, reduced
underpricing worth $5.3 million (national IPO specialists definition 1), $3.8 million (city IPO
specialists definition 1), $6.2 million (national IPO specialists definition 2), and $6.7 million (city
IPO specialists definition 2). These results are robust to the propensity score matching method.
Thus, my results suggest that while there are costs to an issuer that engages an IPO
specialist auditor (higher audit fees), there are also benefits to the issuer (lower subsequent first-
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Using my first measure of specialization, this fee premium at the national IPO specialist level
equates to, on average, a $477,515 audit fee premium above non-national IPO specialists, while
for city IPO specialists the fee is $787,623 higher than for non-city IPO specialists. Using my
second measure of specialization, this fee premium at the national IPO specialist level equates to,
on average, a $948,537 audit fee premium above non-national IPO specialists, while for city IPO
specialists the fee is $871,864 higher than for non-city IPO specialists. These fees compare to IPO
proceeds, which average $173 million in my sample. While these audit fee premiums may seem
high compared to post-IPO audit fee premium studies, the average audit fees charged in my IPO
sample are less than 0.5% of proceeds raised, while average underwriter fees are much larger at
8.79% of proceeds (Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu 2007)
5

day issuer underpricing). In other words, national IPO specialists (definition 1) earn, on average,
a $477,515 audit fee premium while reducing underpricing by $5.3 million. City IPO specialists
(definition 1) earn, on average, a $787,623 audit fee premium while reducing underpricing by $3.8
million. National IPO specialists (definition 2) earn, on average, a $948,537 audit fee premium
while reducing underpricing by $6.2 million. City IPO specialists (definition 2) earn, on average,
an $871,864 audit fee premium while reducing underpricing by $6.7 million.
My study contributes to both the auditor specialization literature and the IPO audit
literature. First, while a vast stream of literature exists on auditor specialization, these studies
mainly focus on industry wide auditor specialization (Bills, Jeter, and Stein 2015; Fung and
Krishnan 2012; Cahan, Jeter, and Naiker 2011; Reichelt and Wang 2010; Carson and Fargher
2007; Francis et al. 2005; Casterella, Francis, Lewis, and Walker 2004). Additionally, Mayhew
and Wilkins (2003) use IPO clients’ audit fees to examine industry specialization and find that
industry specialist audit firms earn fee premiums. While the setting for their study is IPO clients,
they only investigate industry specialist auditors and do not investigate IPO specialist auditors. My
investigation on auditor specialization in the IPO market contributes to the auditor specialization
literature by focusing on a unique, highly complex audit engagement not yet examined in the
auditor specialization literature.
Second, prior IPO audit literature focuses either on only Big 4 audit firms for IPO audits
(Hogan 1997) or on the effect of additional auditor legal liability under the 1933 Securities Act
(1933 Act) on audit quality (Venkataraman, Weber, and Willenborg 2008). My study provides
evidence on whether audit firms and audit offices, regardless of size, specialize in IPO audits. My
analysis helps better understand differences of audit fees in the IPO market between IPO
specialized audit firms and offices, and non-specialized audit firms and offices. My paper also
6

extends our understanding of how legal liability under the 1933 Act affects auditors as I
demonstrate that within this increased legal liability regime, IPO audit specialization occurs,
affecting audit pricing and reducing underpricing.
A better understanding of audit pricing in the IPO market should also provide audit firms
with practical information for when they develop business strategies to differentiate themselves
from other audit firms and offices in the course of becoming an IPO specialist auditor. In particular,
my study provides evidence that smaller auditors identified by market concentration levels can
also earn a fee premium in the IPO audit market. This study also provides useful information to
IPO market participants, such as issuers and investors, as the results demonstrate that certain
auditors specialize in the IPO audit market and that these specialized auditors reduce underpricing.
Private companies considering an IPO will likely benefit from knowing the costs and benefits of
hiring a particular auditor, and which of these auditors differentiate themselves within the IPO
market.
The rest of my paper is organized as follows. Section two provides the background and
hypotheses development. Section three describes my sample and data. Section four presents
research methodology. Section five discusses results. Section six provides additional analysis. The
last section concludes my paper.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
BACKGROUND
Auditor liability under the Securities Act of 1933.

The role of auditors as an information intermediary in the IPO setting is critical in reducing
information asymmetry between issuers of the security and potential investors (Weber and
Willenborg 2003). As such, regulators impose higher litigation risk to auditors in order to protect
capital providers investing in initial public offerings. The increased litigation risk to the auditor in
the IPO process is a result of additional liability that the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) imposes
on auditors when auditing financial statements of IPO firms (Venkataraman et al. 2008). The 1933
Act was enacted by the United States Congress for the primary purpose of increasing disclosure to
prospective investors and was drafted as a “Truth in Securities Act” which emphasized “public
disclosure of material information as the primary mechanism for federal regulation of the securities
markets” (Ruder 1988).
Venkataraman et al. (2008) detail differences between the 1933 Act and the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act (1934 Act) with respect to the auditor’s litigation risk. For example, in accordance
with the 1933 Act, firms going public must provide a registration statement which includes a
detailed prospectus and audited financial statements for up to three years of financial statements.
The auditor is also required to issue a “comfort letter” to the underwriter which provides assurance
concerning the information in the registration statement that the auditor’s report does not cover
and for subsequent events after the audit report date (Venkataraman et al. 2008).
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Legal exposure to the auditor is also higher under the 1933 Act because the auditor is
required to demonstrate that they exercised due diligence as opposed to the lower threshold of
good faith for post-IPO audits which are conducted in accordance with the 1934 Act. In other
words, in the course of litigation brought under the 1933 Act, the auditor is liable for ordinary
negligence. Investors, as plaintiffs, can sue auditors without proving their reliance on the financial
statements. In contrast, litigants must demonstrate that the auditor demonstrated grossly negligent
behavior when bringing suit under the 1934 Act.
Venkataraman et al. (2008) exploit the heightened level of legal liability imposed to
auditors in the IPO setting by investigating the relation between auditor exposure to legal liability
and audit quality. They conclude that audit quality is higher for IPO audits based on their finding
that audit fees for IPO audits are higher and signed discretionary accruals are more negative in the
IPO period. They argue that higher IPO audit fees compensate auditors for litigation risk and long
audit hours required for IPO audits. They also posit that the increased threat of litigation to the
auditor in the IPO audit leads the auditor to cede less discretion to managers.
However, another line of prior studies argues that management’s incentive to report strong
performance in financial statements leading up to the IPO to increase offering price outweighs the
auditor’s demand for conservatism. Friedlan (1994) provides evidence that IPO issuers make
income increasing discretionary accruals in their financial statements because reporting strong
financial performance leads to a better IPO offering price. Friedlan (1994) points out that the
limited sources of publicly available information leading up to the IPO (compared to seasoned
equity offerings) allows management higher discretion in reporting earnings.
Teoh et al. (1998) argue along similar lines that the incentive to manage earnings is strong
when the firm is planning to sell shares in the market as an IPO because reporting better financial
9

performance may lead to a higher offering price. Furthermore, the opportunity to manage earnings
also exists because of the high degree of information asymmetry present in the IPO market. Efendi,
Srivastava, and Swanson (2007) find that among firms that raised new equity capital, those that
subsequently restate their financials raised more new equity capital than firms without a
restatement. They argue that a firm’s ability to raise equity capital and the cost of new capital is
largely dependent on the firms’ financial performance (i.e. accounting numbers). Managers are
incentivized to report strong financial performance to increase offer price, but if they report
aggressively, they take a risk of a subsequent financial restatement (Efendi et al. 2007).
The unique nature of the IPO setting, a combination of managerial incentives for aggressive
financial reporting and the auditor’s opposite incentives to constrain this behavior gives rise to
several questions. How do managers of IPO firms choose an auditor? Do certain audit firms (and/or
offices) specialize in the audit of IPO firms? If so, how are IPO specialized auditors priced? And,
if IPO specialized auditors earn fee premiums, do they provide a benefit to issuers in the way of
reducing first-day underpricing? Providing evidence as to whether auditors differentiate
themselves from other auditors in the audit of IPO firms should be of great interest to audit firms,
issuers, investors, and regulators.
IPO specialists
A wealth of research has focused on auditor industry specialization within the audit market.
However, prior literature on the subject of auditor industry specialization typically considers the
audit market as a whole (Casterella et al. 2004; Mayhew and Wilkins 2003; Dunn and Mayhew
2004; Low 2004; Huang et al. 2007; Kwon et al. 2007; Cenker and Nagy 2008; Li et al. 2010;
Reichelt and Wang 2010; Fung et al. 2012; Ferguson et al. 2014; Cairney and Stewart 2015; Bills
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et al. 2015; Balsam et al. 2003). What prior research on industry specialization has not done is
distinguish between first time public registrants and existing public registrants.
Prior research tends to agree that positive network synergies are created as a result of
industry expertise in both national audit firms and local offices of audit firms (Bental and Spiegel
1995; Katz and Shapiro 1985). At the firm-wide level, audit firms gain industry expertise by
sharing industry focused knowledge and experience, such as the usage of standardized industrytailored audit programs, internal benchmarking of best practices, and the exchange of industry
specialized personnel among different offices within an audit firm (Reichelt and Wang 2010).
At the office level, auditors obtain “deep personal knowledge of clients” and local business
conditions that cannot be easily transferable and distributable to other offices (Reichelt and Wang
2010). Auditor’s individual knowledge at the local office level plays an essential role in
determining audit quality because audit firms are formed “with partnerships where key audit
decisions are made at local offices” (Reichelt and Wang 2010). For example, auditors contract
with clients, administer audit engagements, and issue audit reports signed on the letterhead of the
local office of the audit firm (Francis, Stokes, and Anderson 1999).
I extend prior literature on the subject of auditor specialization by examining auditor
specialization for first time public issuers. I expect that through more experience with IPO audits,
IPO specialized auditors should be able to gain a deep knowledge of complex legal and technical
requirements for first time filings, and become experts in the idiosyncratic set of requirements and
expectations that private companies transforming into public companies must comply with.
An IPO audit is different from a post-IPO audit for several reasons. First, IPO auditors are
required to certify that IPO clients have audited financial statements for up to three years prior to
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the IPO.3 If the current auditor at the time of the IPO has not audited the prior year financials, the
auditor therefore may be responsible for auditing up to three years of financials in one year. I argue
that auditing a private company’s financials for multiple years is different from auditing one year
of a public companies financial information, leading IPO auditors to develop special skills and to
gain unique experience in order to provide reasonable assurance for this unique engagement.
Additionally, IPO auditors should develop specialized knowledge about how to aid in
applying rules and interpretations for first time registrants including Rule 3-05 of regulation S-X,
Financial Statements of Businesses Acquired or to be Acquired, Accounting Standards
Codification (ASC) 718, Compensation-Stock Compensation, and SAB Topic 14, Share-Based
Payment, ASC 480-10-S99, Classification and Measurement of Redeemable Securities. In
addition, IPO auditors should be better able to help applying complicated provisions of the JOBS
Act to their clients. Those rules can change the required number of years of audited financial
statements according to the significance of clients.4
Furthermore, IPO auditors are required to issue a comfort letter for underwriters and other
requesting parties in connection with the registration statement and financial statement schedules
contained in registration statements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission under the

“Registrants must present the summarized balance sheet information for the most recent two
fiscal years and the summarized income statement information for the most recent three years,
unless the entity qualifies as a smaller reporting company or as an EGC in the IPO, in which case
summarized income statement information is only required for the most recent two years” (Ernst
&Young LLP 2015).
4 An example from EY (2015): “a calendar-year company initially files an IPO registration
statement on 1 April 2015. Registrant acquired Company A, a non-accelerated filer, on 1 August
2014. Company A has a calendar year end. Registrant meets the conditions and applies SAB Topic
1.J, which results in Company A being significant at the 25% level using 2014 pro forma financial
information. Under the regular significance test based on 2013 financial information, Company A
was significant at the 35% level. This registrant must provide a combination of pre-acquisition and
post-acquisition periods that result in a continuous audited period of at least 21 months”.
3
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1933 Act.5 IPO auditors are requested to provide assurance regarding information in the
registration statement that the auditor’s report does not cover and for subsequent events following
the audit report date (Venkataraman et al. 2008). In many cases, IPO auditors are also required to
issue consent multiple times for revisions to the S-1 filing because the SEC occasionally issues
comments back to IPO clients leading to revisions to the S-1. IPO auditors thus have to issue
consent, and likely under time pressure because the markets for IPO are extremely time-sensitive.6
All of these requirements unique to IPO audits should lead to the development of IPO audit
expertise.
Furthermore, prior IPO audit experience of the auditor should signal to managers and
investors that the auditor possesses an expertise with the distinct SEC filing requirements for IPO
firms. This expertise should provide the auditor with the ability to skillfully lead the IPO firm
through the complex filing requirements. I expect that clients value auditors with experience in the
audit of IPO firms, leading to IPO specialist auditors garnering even more IPO audit engagements.
Such a phenomenon should lead to some auditors developing IPO specialization.
At the firm level, audit firms may develop IPO expertise by sharing IPO focused
knowledge and experience. For example, audit firms may develop standardized IPO audit

A comfort letter typically includes “a statement as to the accountants’ independence from the
issuer, the compliance of the issuer’s audited financial statements with applicable SEC
requirements, statements regarding the accountants’ review of interim unaudited financial
statements, negative assurance statements relating to the unaudited comparative stub period
financial statements included in the registration statement, recital of any changes in selected key
line items during the period after the date of the lasts financial statements in the registration
statement, and comments on the results of additional procedures performed on the miscellaneous
financial information in the registration statement.”(Morrison & Foerster LLP 2016)
6 For example, Facebook, Inc revised the S-1 filing eight times from February 8, 2012 to May 16,
2012. Groupon, Inc revised the S-1 filing eight times from July 14, 2011 to November 02, 2011.
Linkedin Corp revised the S-1 filing eight times from March 11, 2011 to November 16, 2011.
5
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programs and then utilize IPO specialized personnel whom are exchanged among different
offices.7 At the office level, audit offices may gain more experience than other offices if the
locations of offices are in an area where more young, start-up and growth companies incorporate
their business. This deep personal knowledge of IPO audits developed in the audit office may not
be readily transferable and distributable to other offices in the audit firm. Therefore, IPO audit
expertise may develop both at the audit firm level and at the audit office level.
Many audit firms, both Big4 and non-Big 4, advertise their IPO services on their websites.
Table 1 provides a summary of how annually inspected audit firms from the PCAOB discuss their
role in IPO audits on their websites.8 Among Big4 audit firms, Ernst & Young LLP and PWC LLP
provide more detailed information about their IPO services through annual and quarterly
publications. In contrast, KPMG LLP does not have any publication about IPO service.
Among non-Big 4 firms, BDO USA, Crowe Horwath, and RSM US discuss IPO audit
service. Other annually inspected non-Big 4 audit firms do not have any IPO services discussed in
their website. Based on the variation of the claims made by audit firms on their website, I expect
certain audit firms regardless of their size (Big 4 firms versus non-Big 4 firms) to gain expertise
within the IPO audit market and to specialize in IPO audits.

BDO Seidman LLP on its website states “BDO’s flat structure and partner-led service model
ensures that you have access to senior-level professionals throughout the process. Unlike many
other large firms, our national SEC office is part of the engagement team, and is heavily involved
in the planning stages of your IPO and can help you understand the nuances of registration and
reporting process.” (BDO USA LLP 2016b). An interview with a PriceWaterhouseCoopers
director by a member of dissertation committee, Dr. Kenneth Reichelt, at Chicago, IL on August
7th 2015 further supports this argument. This director stated that they bring in IPO specialized
personnel with extensive experience in IPO audits from different offices for complex IPO audits.
8 Audit firms providing audit reports for more than 100 public registrants are annually inspected
by the PCAOB, while audit firms providing audit reports for less than 100 public registrants are
triennially inspected by the PCAOB.
7
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IPO leaders

Director,
Accounting &
Reporting
Transformation

Publication

Big 4

Our IPO Advisory Services team provides the Strategies for going public Fourth
end-to-end, “turn-key” solutions and
edition in 2014
strategies your organization needs through the
IPO process. Our tools and methodologies
help companies mitigate transaction risk and
compress execution timelines so you can stay
focused on your company and investors.

Americas IPO
Leader
Asia-Pacific
IPO Leader
EMEIA IPO
Leader
Japan IPO
Leader

Roles in IPO audits from websites

Big 4

We’ve been guiding high-growth companies 1Q 2016 Global IPO Trends
and business leaders safely through the IPO
Report(every quarter), IPO and
process and beyond for decades. Many of the Strategic WEOY 2016 – IPO and
emerging entrepreneurial companies we have Strategic Transactions Summit
worked with have gone on to become major
Brochure 2016, Taking it to heart
global organizations. We can help you get
2015, Technical Line 2015, The
through the three phases of a successful IPO: JOBS Act:2015 mid-year update
2015, IPO readiness 2013, EY's
Guide to going public 2013, IPO
destination
guide 2013, Life after an IPO 2013,
and Risk management after an IPO
2013
N/A

Big 4

Class

Table 1: IPO Auditor Role from Websites-Annual filers
Audit firms
Deloitte &
Touche

Ernst & Young

KPMG

National
Leader, IPO
Readiness

KPMG in conjunction with the NYSE and
additional contributors have developed the
2013 NYSE IPO Guide which is designed to
help companies considering an IPO better
navigate through the process and gain an
understanding of both the benefits and
challenges.
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Class

Roles in IPO audits from websites

(Table 1 continued)

Audit firms
Big 4

Second-tier BDO has guided numerous companies in
going public, from the initial planning stage
through to the final filing of the registration
statement and initial reporting. BDO’s flat
structure and partner-led service model
ensures that you have access to senior-level
professionals throughout the process. Unlike
many other large firms, our national SEC
office is part of the engagement team, and is
heavily involved in the planning stages of your
IPO and can help you understand the nuances
of registration and reporting process. Our
many years of experience have allowed us to
build a relationship–and credibility–with both
the SEC and investment banks.

PWC

BDO USA

Second-tier N/A

We advise clients throughout the life cycle of
the IPO process, from pre-IPO readiness
preparation to the offering process and
beyond.

Grant Thornton
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IPO leaders

Publication

N/A

IPO Market Watch Q1 2016,
IPO specialists:1
Executing a successful IPO 2015, leader, 11
2015 Annual US Capital Markets Partners and 6
Watch 2016, Material weaknesses: Directors
Why disclosing them before your
IPO may make sense 2015,
and Considering an IPO? An
insight into the costs post-JOBS
Act 2015
Capital Markets Practice
Partner BDO
Newsbytes 2016, 2015 BDO IPO New
Outlook, 2015 BDO IPO Halftime YorkPartner
Report, and Access to Capital
BDO New
Markets 2013
YorkPartner
BDO Dallas
Office

N/A
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Class

(Table 1 continued)
Audit firms

Roles in IPO audits from websites

Publication

IPO leaders

N/A

Third-tier

N/A

Crowe Horwath

N/A

N/A

Managing
Partner,
Private Equity
Services

Third-tier

N/A

Crowe Horwath LLP can help you prepare Reaching the Pinnacle - A Guide
for and manage a timely exit strategy. We to Going Public and Living as a
can help guide you through the IPO
Public Company 2015
registration process and help you address
the critical steps that are needed
throughout the IPO – and beyond.

MaloneBailey

N/A

N/A

Third-tier
Third-tier

Successful IPO execution requires
a multidisciplined approach 2015,
RSM helps biopharmaceutical
company save IPO price 2015

Marcum
RSM US

We assist you with an industry
experienced team to get through the
process in a timely and effective manner.

This table provides the described roles for IPO clients of all 10 annually inspected registrants of the PCAOB. Audit firms
providing audit reports for more than 100 public registrants are annually inspected by the PCAOB, while audit firms providing
audit reports for less than 100 public registrants are triennially inspected by the PCAOB. Roles in IPO audits are how annual
filers discuss their role in IPO audits on the World Wide Web.
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HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
IPO expertise and audit fees
A large number of studies document a positive association between audit fees and auditor
industry specialization (Craswell et al. 1995; Ferguson et al. 2003; Francis et al. 2005; Mayhew
and Wilkins 2003; Numan and Willekens 2012). Craswell et al. (1995) find evidence of an
industry-specific premium which is distinct from the Big 8 general brand name premium. They
quantify the industry specialist Big 8 premium over non-specialist Big 8 auditors as being
approximately 34%. Bae, Choi, and Rho (2016) provides an alternative explanation for the higher
audit fee premium for industry specialists with evidence that industry specialists expend
significantly greater audit hours than non-industry specialists. They argue that the greater audit
hours associated with industry specialization may suggest higher audit quality or may simply
indicate additional audit work performed by relatively cheaper junior auditors.
Auditor reputation at both the national level and office level is priced by the audit market
and leads to the expertise of the auditor being recognized by clients (Francis et al. 2005). Francis
et al. (2005) document that there is a significant fee premium of 19 percent if auditors are both
national-level and city-level industry leaders. There is a fee premium of eight percent if auditors
are city-level industry leaders alone. They find no evidence of a premium for auditors who are
national industry leaders alone. This finding suggests that an auditor's reputation for industry
expertise is priced when the auditor is both the national industry leader and the city-specific
industry leader. This result can be interpreted as evidence that industry expertise transfers across
offices because national industry leadership affects the audit fee premium.
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However, there is another line of studies discussing auditor fees, industry specialization
and economics of scale (Cahan et al. 2011; Fung et al. 2012). Cahan et al. (2011) find that audit
fees and audit quality are higher (lower) when the specialist audits a lower (higher) proportion of
clients in an industry. They argue that specialists auditing a smaller proportion of clients in an
industry are likely to charge fee premiums to recover their investments and provide high quality
audits to differentiate themselves as project specialists. In contrast, specialists auditing a larger
proportion of clients in an industry are likely to develop economies of scale which reduces costs
but also leads to lower quality audits.
Fung et al. (2012) document that industry specialist auditors earn 14.8 percent fee
premiums but an economy of scale discount of 1.7 percent for a one-decile increase in percentile
rankings of the number of audit clients at the city-industry level. More recent research finds that
industry specialists charge lower audit fees in industries with homogenous operations and in
industries with both homogenous operations and complex accounting practices without sacrificing
audit quality (Bills et al. 2015). Further analysis shows that industry specialists charge significantly
lower fees in homogenous as well as both homogenous and complex industries only when the
client’s bargaining power is relatively high.
Based on the findings from prior studies about audit fee premiums, I posit that IPO
specialists will exhibit audit fee premiums that outweigh fee discounts due to economies of scale
because IPO clients do not have homogenous operations and the number of IPO clients is smaller
than the number of clients in the post-IPO audit market. Therefore, economies of scale arising
from homogenous operations and audit investment cost being spread over a large client base will
be relatively small for the IPO market.
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Furthermore, in the IPO setting, Hogan (1997) argues that IPO firms will choose a higher
quality auditor if the benefit of hiring a higher quality auditor outweighs the cost. She uses audit
fees as the cost of hiring a higher quality auditor and lower underpricing as the benefit of hiring a
higher quality auditor. Chang, Gygax, Oon, and Zhang (2008) finds that Big4 auditors earn
significantly higher fees than non-Big4 auditors in the Australian IPO market. This result suggests
that clients are willing to pay Big4 auditors higher fees because they expect these auditors to
deliver higher audit quality. If IPO specialist auditors are able to provide higher quality audits to
IPO firms, differentiated from other auditors, then I expect these auditors to also receive higher
fees from their clients. These arguments lead to my first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: IPO clients with an IPO specialist auditor pay higher audit fees compared to clients
with non-IPO specialists.
IPO expertise and first-day underpricing
Issuer underpricing occurs when the offer price of IPO shares is lower than the closing
price of the shares on the first day of the IPO. It is well documented that significant underpricing
occurs in the IPO market.9 One explanation for issuer underpricing is because of the high level of
information asymmetry which exists between insiders and investors. Weber and Willenborg
(2003) argue that the problems which arise due to information asymmetry in the capital markets
are most severe in the IPO of equity due to “the absence of a track record to aid in security
valuation” (Weber and Willenborg 2003). Relative to issuers of the security, potential investors in
the IPO setting possess significantly inferior knowledge about the firm’s prospects and future cash
flows (Carter and Manaster 1990; Leland and Pyle 1977; Ross 1977).

9

Li, Lin, and Robinson (2016) document underpricing over the years 1987-2010 of 20.66%.
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While issuers of the firm have access to extensive knowledge regarding the firm’s
economic potential and the internal operation (Leland and Pyle 1977), the amount of information
potential investors have about IPO firms is often limited because there are only a few sources of
publicly available information for private firms. Moreover, the current owners of the firm have
incentives to opportunistically misrepresent the performance of the firm to potential investors
(Downes and Heinkel 1982). This incentive, combined with the high degree of information
asymmetry in the IPO market further increases the possibility of opportunistic behavior by sellers
of the security (Cohen and Dean 2005).
Furthermore, unlike informed investors, uninformed investors are often unable to
distinguish between “good” IPO issues and “bad” IPO issues, which can lead to the uninformed
investors performing poorly and ultimately deciding not to participate in the IPO market (Rock
1986). Informed investors are discussed in Ritter (1984) as incurring a cost to determine the firm’s
true value. If the cost is too high, investors will remain uninformed. Despite being uninformed,
these investors can still be encouraged to continue participating in the IPO market (at the expense
of the firm) despite their informational disadvantage if the IPO is priced low by the underwriters
(Rock 1986).
Accounting information plays an important role in mitigating information asymmetry in
market-based economies by allowing investors to better evaluate the return potential of investment
opportunities (Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther 2010). However, potential investors may choose
to ignore or place less weight on information released by IPO firms because of the combination of
the issuers’ incentive (to achieve a high offer price) and opportunity (high information asymmetry)
to misrepresent or omit financial information. These combined information asymmetries and
agency conflicts increase the demand for credible financial disclosure (Healy and Palepu 2001).
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The credibility of financial disclosure is enhanced by regulators, standard setters, auditors
and other capital market intermediaries (Healy and Palepu 2001). In particular, high quality audits
provide independent assurance of the credibility of accounting information, improving resource
allocation and contracting efficiency (DeFond and Zhang 2014). Previous studies argue that the
nature of the IPO market should give rise to a demand for high quality auditors in the IPO market
to uncover information about firm value to investors (Simunic and Stein 1987; Datar et al. 1991).
Once private entities decide to go public, they select an auditor to audit the financial information
contained in the registration statement. Datar, Feltham, and Hughes (1991) argue that the demand
for a high quality audit increases as the issuing firm specific risk increases because issuers can
signal firm value by hiring high quality auditors who deliver more precise information about the
issuers’ firm value. The assurance provided by auditors should help to reduce, to some extent, the
information asymmetry between issuers of the security and potential investors (Hogan 1997).
Because of the expertise IPO specialist auditors should possess as a result of their
experience in previous IPO audits, I expect they will be able to provide higher quality IPO audits
which then reduce information asymmetry between issuers and investors. As such, I expect issuers
with IPO specialist auditors to exhibit lower levels of first-day underpricing.
Hypothesis 2: IPO clients with an IPO specialist auditor will be associated with lower levels of
first-day underpricing.
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CHAPTER 3
SAMPLE AND DATA
I use a sample of companies going public from January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2015. I
use data from SDC, Audit Analytics, COMPUSTAT and CRSP databases. I start my IPO sample
period from the IPO issue year in 2002, of which the pre-period is 2001, because the Audit
Analytics database fully includes all auditor information beginning in 2001. I examine the fiscal
year immediately prior to the IPO issue date. Auditor information, such as auditor names, audit
offices, audit fees, and total fees are identified using the Audit Analytics opinion database.10
Financial statement information is obtained from COMPUSTAT. Stock price information is
obtained from CRSP.
To create the audit fees sample, I start with 2,695 firm-commitment IPOs on the SDC
database with valid CUSIPs from January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2015. I drop 206 American
Depository Receipts (ADRs) IPOs, 423 firms with missing Audit Analytics data, 420 firms with
missing MSAs, 102 firms with missing COMPUSTAT data, and 318 firms in the finance industry.
This sample selection criteria yields 1,226 unique IPO firms. For my underpricing tests, I further
drop 204 firms with missing CRSP data which yields 1,022 unique IPO firms for my underpricing

10

I use audit fee data from Audit Analytics because they provide this data over my sample period
of January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2015. Audit Analytics states that audit fees “consist in all fees
necessary to perform the audit or review in accordance with GAAS. This category also may include
services that generally only the independent accountant reasonably can provide, such as comfort
letters, statutory audits, attest services, consents and assistance with and review of documents filed
with the SEC”. To gain a level of assurance about the accuracy of Audit Analytics audit fee data,
I randomly select 10 IPOs and compare audit fees in the proxy disclosure to audit fees in Audit
Analytics database. I did not find any difference in audit fees from the proxy to the database.
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tests. Table 2, Panel A presents details of the sample selection criteria for my audit fees tests and
my underpricing tests.
Table 2, Panel B tabulates the distribution of the 1,226 firm-commitment IPOs by issue
year for the period from 2002 to 2015. This distribution highlights that fewer companies went
public after the Dot-Com bust (2000-2002). In contrast, there was a large increase in the number
of companies that went public from 2004 to 2007 followed by a sharp decline in 2008 due to the
financial crisis. The number of IPO’s then gradually increases from 2008 to 2012. There is also a
large increase in IPO activity beginning in 2012 after the passage of the JOBS Act on March 8,
2012.
Table 2, Panel C presents the industry distribution for my audit fees sample. There are more
than 23 industries represented in my sample. The three largest industries are: chemicals and allied
products (23%), business services (21%), and instruments and related products (8%).
Table 2, Panel D demonstrates the city distribution for my sample. City is defined as a
Metropolitan Statistical Area following the 2005 U.S. Census Bureau metropolitan statistical areas
(MSA) definitions. There are 71 MSAs in which IPO auditors are located. The top five MSAs for
IPO activity are New York-Newark-Jersey City, San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, BostonCambridge-Newton, Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, and San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward.
These five MSAs compose 45% of my sample, suggesting that 45% of IPO clients hire auditors
located in these five MSAs.
Table 3, Panel A shows the definition of IPO specialist auditors and national and city IPO
specialist auditors by year. I first define IPO specialist auditors as a national (city) IPO specialist
if the auditor has the largest annual market share in the IPO market at the U.S. national (city) level
and has more than 10% greater market share than the closest competitor. City is defined as a
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Metropolitan Statistical Area following the 2005 U.S. Census Bureau metropolitan statistical areas
(MSA) definitions. I also define IPO specialist auditors as a national (city) IPO specialist if the
auditor has the largest ratio of market share of IPO clients over market share of total clients at the
U.S. national (city) level, and has more than 10% greater market share than the closest competitor
for a given fiscal year, and 0 otherwise.11 I use this additional portfolio measure to identify IPO
specialists in addition to the market share measure to address the concern that the market share
measure may be more likely to identify specialist auditors if the auditor charges audit fees that are
systematically higher.

Table 2. Sample Selection Criteria and Sample Characteristics
Panel A. Sample Selection for audit fees tests and underpricing tests
Number of firm-commitment IPOs on the SDC database with valid CUSIPs for 2002-2015 2,695
Less: American Depository Receipts (ADRs) and Units IPOs

206

Less: Firms with missing Audit Analytics database

423

Less: Auditors not located in MSAs

420

Less: Firms with missing Compustat data

102

Less: Firms in finance industry

318

Final Sample in audit fees analysis

1,226

Less: Firms with missing CRSP data

204

Final Sample in underpricing tests

1,022

11

In the second definition of IPO specialist auditors, I use the ratio of the top five largest auditors
for a national IPO specialist in order to have enough observations. Compared to the first specialist
definition using IPO market share level, smaller auditors have a large proportion of IPO clients
over total clients using the IPO market concentration level, thus their number of clients does not
lead to enough observations.
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Panel B: Distribution of IPO firms by year
Year
No. of firms
2002
17
2003
40
2004
117
2005
109
2006
124
2007
127
2008
18
2009
40
2010
67
2011
66
2012
91
2013
125
2014
173
2015
112
Total
1,226

% of sample
1.39
3.26
9.54
8.89
10.11
10.36
1.47
3.26
5.46
5.38
7.42
10.2
14.11
9.14
100.00

Panel C: Distribution of IPO firms by SIC industry (Table 2 Continued)
SIC
Industry
Total
13
Oil And Gas Extraction
52
15
General Building Contractors
9
20
Food And Kindred Products
17
28
Chemicals And Allied Products
285
33
Primary Metal Industries
14
35
Industrial Machinery And Equipment
39
36
Electronic & Other Electric Equipment
84
37
Transportation Equipment
20
38
Instruments And Related Products
95
44
Water Transportation
12
48
Communications
28
49
Electric, Gas, And Sanitary Services
28
50
Wholesale Trade-Durable Goods
20
51
Wholesale Trade-Nondurable Goods
12
54
Food Stores
9
56
Apparel And Accessory Stores
9
58
Eating And Drinking Places
31
59
Miscellaneous Retail
19
73
Business Services
256
78
Motion Pictures
26
80
Health Services
9
82
Educational Services
24
87
Engineering & Management Services
52
Other
128
1,226
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% of sample
4.24
0.73
1.39
23.25
1.14
3.18
6.85
1.63
7.75
0.98
2.28
2.28
1.63
0.98
0.73
0.73
2.53
1.55
20.88
2.12
0.73
1.96
4.24
10.41
100.0

Panel D: Distribution of IPO Auditors by Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) (Table 2
Continued)
% of
Metropolitan Statistical Areas
Total
sample
New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA
153
12.48
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA
142
11.58
Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH
110
8.97
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA
78
6.36
San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward, CA
72
5.87
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
51
4.16
San Diego-Carlsbad, CA
49
4.00
Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI
42
3.43
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD
41
3.34
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV
39
3.18
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX
38
3.10
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO
35
2.85
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI
25
2.04
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
19
1.55
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA
18
1.47
Durham-Chapel Hill, NC
17
1.39
Austin-Round Rock, TX
16
1.31
Indianapolis-Carmel-Anderson, IN
15
1.22
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL
15
1.22
Other
52
20.42
Total
1,226
100.0
City is defined as a Metropolitan Statistical Area following the 2005 U.S. Census Bureau
metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) definitions. There are 71 MSAs. The sample is 1,226
firm-commitment IPOs from January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2015

Table 3, Panel A-1 presents national IPO specialist auditors by year under my first
definition of IPO specialization. PWC LLP is the national IPO specialist for eight out of 14 years
followed by PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (three out of 14 years) and Deloitte & Touche LLP (two
out of 14 years). There is no national IPO specialist in 2010 because the auditor with the largest
market share does not have more than 10% greater market share than the closest competitor.
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Table 3, Panel A-2 presents city IPO specialist auditors by year under my first definition
of IPO specialization. There are 10 audit firms identified as audit firms with city IPO specialist
audit offices. The majority of city IPO specialist auditors are Big 4 auditors because my first
definition uses market share to define city IPO specialist auditors. City IPO specialists are
distributed as follows: Ernst & Young LLP is the city IPO specialist in 68 cities over 14 years;
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP is the city IPO specialist in 33 cities over 14 years; Deloitte &
Touche LLP is the city IPO specialist in 23 cities over 14 years; and KPMG is the city IPO
specialist in 11 cities over 14 years.
Table 3, Panel A-3 shows the top five national IPO specialists by year under my second
definition of IPO specialization. Using this measure of IPO specialization results in a greater
variety of audit firms being designated as IPO specialists. Big 4 audit firms are in the top five of
national IPO specialists only in years 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2007. For the other ten years, non-Big
4 audit firms are in the top five of national IPO specialists. This composition is very different from
the national IPO specialist list using my first definition in Table 3, Panel A-1.
Table 3, Panel A-4 shows the city IPO specialists by year under my second definition of
IPO specialization. There are 17 audit firms defined as audit firms with city IPO specialist auditors
under my second definition. The majority of city IPO specialist auditors are still Big 4 auditors.
However, an interesting trend emerges in more recent years: smaller audit firms are more often
identified as a city IPO specialist auditor.
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CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH METHOD
I use the dependent variable LNAFEES, measured as the natural log of a firm’s annual audit
fees of an IPO audit (the fiscal year immediately prior to the IPO issue date). The test variable
IPOSPEC is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if an auditor is an IPO specialist auditor,
and 0 otherwise. To test whether audit fees are positively associated with IPO specialist auditors,
I regress LNAFEES on IPOSPEC. The regression model combining control variables used by
Mayhew and Wilkins (2003), Francis et al. (2005), Venkataraman et al. (2008), and Minutti-Meza
(2013) is as follows:
𝐿𝑁𝐴𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑆 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶 + 𝛽3 𝐸𝐺𝐶 + 𝛽4 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽5 𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆
+ 𝛽6 𝑆𝐸𝐺𝐵𝑈𝑆 + 𝛽7 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐴𝑅 + 𝛽8 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁 + 𝛽9 𝐶𝐴𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽10 𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐶𝐾 + 𝛽11 𝑅𝑂𝐴
+ 𝛽12𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽13 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽14 𝐼𝐶𝑊 + 𝛽15 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽16 𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐶
+ 𝛽17𝐵𝐼𝐺4 + 𝛽18 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑅 + 𝛽19 𝐿𝐼𝑇 + 𝛽20 𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝐹𝐸
+ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, (1),
A significant positive coefficient on IPOSPEC would support my first hypothesis that IPO
clients with an IPO specialist auditor pay higher audit fees compared to clients with non-IPO
specialists. INDUSTRYSPEC is 1 if auditors have the largest annual market share in a given
industry at the U.S. national level (city level) and have more than 10% greater market share than
the closest competitor, and 0 otherwise.12 Prior studies show a positive association between audit
fees and auditor industry specialization (Craswell et al. 1995; Ferguson et al. 2003; Francis et al.
2005; Mayhew and Wilkins 2003; Numan and Willekens 2012). I expect INDUSTRYSPEC to have
a positive coefficient.

12

To identify industry specialists, I use the entire audit analytics sample, not only IPO sample.
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EGC is an indicator variable which takes the value one if the client files as an emerging
growth company whose annual revenues are less than $1 billion, and zero otherwise. The JOBS
Act, which streamlined the IPO process for EGC should have a negative effect on audit fees. SIZE
is the natural log of a client’s total assets. LNSALES is the natural log of total sales. Higher fees
are expected for larger clients (DeAngelo 1981). SEGBUS is the natural log of the number of
unique business segments. FOREIGN is calculated by foreign income divided by total income.
This variable is set to zero if there is no income from foreign operations. INVAR is sum of inventory
and receivables scaled by total assets. SEGBUS, INVAR, and FOREIGN variables are included to
control for complexity which should increase auditor effort and result in higher audit fees (Francis
et al. 2005).
To control for the client’s inherent risk, I include the ratio of current assets to total assets
(CATA), the ratio of current assets (less inventories) to current liabilities (QUICK), net income
before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets (ROA), total long-term debt scaled by
average total assets (LEV), LOSS, internal control weaknesses (ICW) and GCONCERN. LOSS is 1
if net income is negative, and otherwise 0. ICW is 1 if the client firm has internal control
weaknesses in year t-1, and 0 otherwise. GCONCERN is 1 if the auditor gave a going-concern
opinion to a client in the fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. Variables for the client’s inherent risk are
expected to have positive coefficients (Ferguson et al. 2003).
NONDEC is 1 if the client’s fiscal year-end is not December 31st, and 0 otherwise. It is
expected to have a negative coefficient because fees are usually lower if the client has a year-end
that is not December 31. BIG4 is 1 if a clients’ auditor is one of the Big 4 auditors, and 0 otherwise
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(Minutti-Meza 2013).13 SECTIER is 1 if a client’s auditor is either BDO Seidman LLP or Grant
Thornton LLP, 0 otherwise. Big4 and second tier auditors have a higher reputation which is
positively associated with audit fees (DeAngelo 1981; Basioudis and Francis 2007). LIT controls
for high litigation industry. LIT is an indicator variable which takes the value one if the company
operates in a high litigation industry (SIC codes of 2833–2836, 3570–3577, 3600–3674, 5200–
5961,and 7370–7374), and zero otherwise (Francis et al. 1994). LNPROCEEDS is the natural log
of IPO client’s proceeds to measure the auditor’s maximum litigation risk exposure for IPOs. LIT
and LNPROCEEDS are expected to have positive coefficients because audit fees are higher for
IPOs with higher litigation exposure (Venkataraman et al. 2008). Lastly, year and industry fixed
effects control for the systematic effects of time period and industry characteristics on audit fees.
To examine the relation between auditor IPO specialization and IPO underpricing, I utilize
a multivariate regression model of underpricing used by Li, Lin, and Robinson et al. (2016) as
follows:
𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐺
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶 + 𝛽3 𝐵𝐼𝐺4 + 𝛽4 𝐸𝐺𝐶 + 𝛽5 𝑉𝐶
+ 𝛽6 𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 + 𝛽7 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑂𝑁 + 𝛽8 𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷 + 𝛽9 𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 + 𝛽10 𝑉𝑊𝑇𝑂𝑇
+ 𝛽11 𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑇 + 𝛽12 𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑇𝑂𝑇 + 𝛽13 𝐿𝑁𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽14 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, (2),
where the dependent variable, UNDERPRICING, is defined as first-day closing price minus offer
price scaled by offer price. The test variable IPOSPEC is an indicator variable that takes a value
of 1 if an auditor is an IPO specialist auditor, and 0 otherwise. A significant negative coefficient
on IPOSPEC would support my second hypothesis that IPO clients with an IPO specialist auditor
have lower underpricing compared to clients with non-IPO specialist auditors.

13

At the beginning of my sample time period (i.e. January 1, 2002), Arthur Andersen still existed
and the Big 4 at that time was the Big 5.
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I include INDUSTRYSPEC and BIG4 variables to control for Big 4 audit firm and industry
specialist auditor effects on underpricing. High quality auditors are expected to reduce
underpricing because they mitigate the level of information asymmetry by providing credible
financial information to the public. However, recent prior literature does not find a significant
effect of Big 4 audit firms on underpricing (Chang et al. 2008; Li et al. 2016).
EGC indicates the IPO client files as an emerging growth company. I expect EGC to have
a positive effect on underpricing because a higher degree of information asymmetry likely exists
for emerging growth companies due to the decrease in the regulatory requirements imposed by the
JOBS Act. VC is an indicator variable which equals 1 if the IPO is backed by venture capital, and
otherwise 0. Gompers (1996) and Lee and Wahal (2004) argue that venture capitalists grandstand
when taking their investments public. As such, I expect VC to have a positive effect on
underpricing.
RANK is the underwriter ranking from Carter and Manaster’s (1990). Li et al. (2016) find
a positive association between underwriter ranking and underpricing using the time period 19872010. Because my sample covers 2002-2015, I also expect a positive effect on underpricing.
REVISION is the price change during the IPO book-building process measured by the percentage
price revision from the midpoint of the initial filing range to the offer price. Hanley (1993)
document a positive association between the initial return and the price revision during the book
building process. I expect REVISION to have a positive effect on underpricing. SPREAD is the
underwriters fee calculated as the total underwriting, management and selling fees as a percentage
of the amount offered in the IPO. Li et al. (2016) find a positive association between the level of
underwriter fees and underpricing. I use TECH which identifies firms in the technology industry
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based on four-digit SIC codes (Cliff and Denis 2004). I expect TECH firms to exhibit higher
underpricing.
Lowry (2003) finds that IPO first-day returns are associated with recent past market returns
and recent IPO activity. I control for the market returns for the two months prior to the IPO
(VWTOT), calculated as the sum of the value weighted daily market return for the two months
preceding the IPO. I expect VWTOT to have a positive association with underpricing. To control
for hot IPO cycles, I use IPORET and IPOTOT. IPORET is the average first-day returns for other
IPO firms during the two months prior to the specific IPO firm’s month. IPOTOT is the total
number of IPOs over the two months prior to the specific IPO firm’s month. I expect IPOTOT and
IPORET to have a positive effect on underpricing.
I also control for company age (LNAGE) and the issue size (PROCEEDS). Field and
Karpoff (2002) find a negative relation between firm age and underpricing. PROCEEDS is the log
of IPO proceeds in millions divided by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for the issue year. I expect
PROCEEDS to be negatively associated with underpricing. Following, Li et al. (2016), I use a
two-way clustering approach in which standard errors are clustered by year and 2-digit industry
code (Fama-French industry category) to address correlations among standard errors.
To address endogeneity concerns raised by non-random treatment assignment (Shipman et
al. 2017), I use the propensity score matching (PSM) method to mitigate a self-selection bias issue
in my research as a robustness test. Lawrence, Minutti-Meza, and Zhang (2011) use PSM models
to control for differences in client characteristics between Big 4 clients and non-Big4. MinuttiMeza (2013) uses PSM methods to match clients of industry specialist and non-industry specialist
auditors on a number of dimensions.
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PSM techniques can decrease reliance on functional form misspecification between
variables on observable characteristics.14 I match clients of an IPO specialist auditor with clients
of non-IPO specialist auditors in terms of the propensity score estimated from the selection model
in equation (3) with replacement. Caliper distance is 0.03 following Lawrence et al. (2011). The
probit regression model for the auditor choice, similar to the ones proposed by Lawrence et al.
(2011) and Robin and Zhang (2015) combined with variables relevant to the IPO setting, is as
follows:
PROBIT[𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶 = 1]
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽2 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽3 𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 + 𝛽4 𝑉𝐶 + 𝛽5 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐼𝐺𝐸
+ 𝛽6 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝐺𝐸𝑂 + ∑ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 + 𝜀 (3),
where IPOSPEC is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if an auditor is an IPO specialist
auditor, and 0 otherwise. ATURN is the ratio of sales to average total assets. ROALOSS is one if
ROA is less than zero, and zero otherwise. VC is an indicator variable which equals 1 if the IPO is
backed by venture capital, and otherwise 0. PRESTIGE is an indicator variable which takes 1 if
the underwriter for the IPO has a modified Carter Manaster Rank of 9.1 (Carter and Manaster
1990; Loughran and Ritter 2004; Ertimur et al. 2014) and 0 otherwise. SECGEO is the number of
geographical segments in a ﬁrm. I include all control variables from my audit fees model and my
underpricing model for each test. All variables are as defined in Appendix.

14

Shipman, Swanquist, and Whited (2017) document complications associated with PSM. PSM
is not appropriate when relevant variables are unobserved and reduces sample size leading to
diminished power of tests. PSM design can also significantly change sample composition and
inferences. My study uses both the traditional ordinary least squares regression and the PSM
method and shows consistent results, which should alleviate concerns which arise from
weaknesses inherent in these two econometric approaches.
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CHAPTER 5
RESULTS
Table 3, Panel B tabulates descriptive statistics for my audit fee sample. I partition my
sample between clients with an IPO specialist auditor and clients with non-IPO specialist auditors
under the two definitions of IPO specialists. I find that the natural log of a firm’s annual audit fees
with an IPO specialist auditor are significantly higher in means and medians (at 1% significance
level) except for the means of national level definition 1 and 2, which provides initial evidence to
suggest that IPO specialist auditors earn higher audit fees.
Other control variables including INDUSTRYSPEC (city levels definition 1, national levels
definition 2 and city levels definition 2), EGC (national level definition 2), SIZE (the mean of
national level definition 1, the mean of city level definition 1, and the mean of city level definition
2), CATA (national levels definition 1 and city levels definition 1), ICW (national level definition
1, city level definition 1, and city level definition 2), BIG4, SECTIER, LIT (national level definition
1, city level definition 1 and national level definition 2), and LNPROCEEDS (all means) differ
significantly (at 5% significance level) between the two groups which further supports including
them as control variables in the multivariate analysis.
I report mean and median amounts for audit fees, total assets, revenues, and IPO proceeds
in raw amounts, rather than in the natural logarithm, in order to compare to other IPO studies. The
average of means (medians) audit fees of IPO specialists’ clients are $.875 million ($.519 million),
while the average of means (medians) audit fees of non-IPO specialists’ clients are $.788 million
($.473 million) which is comparable to mean of $.612 million (median of $.413 million) in
Venkatarman et al. (2008) and reasonable considering my study covers the longer and more recent
sample period (2002-2015) than their study (2000-2002).
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The average of means (medians) total assets of IPO specialists’ clients are $606 million
($79 million), while the average of means (medians) total assets of non-IPO specialists’ clients are
$564 million ($78 million) which is comparable to a mean of $421 million (median of $36 million)
in Venkatarman et al. (2008).The average of means (medians) revenue of IPO specialists’ clients
are $538 million ($74 million), while the average of means (medians) revenue of non-IPO
specialists’ clients are $439 million ($73 million) which is comparable to mean of $346 million
(median of $22 million) in Venkatarman et al. (2008). The average of means (medians) proceeds
of IPO specialists’ clients are $177 million ($94 million), while the average of means (medians)
proceeds of non-IPO specialists’ clients are $169 million ($93 million) which is similar to
Venkatarman et al. (2008).
Table 3, Panel C tabulates descriptive statistics for my underpricing sample. I again
partition my sample between clients with an IPO specialist auditor and clients with non-IPO
specialist auditors under the two definitions of IPO specialists. I find that underpricing of clients
with a national IPO specialist auditor using definition 2 is significantly lower in means using a
paired t-test, which provides initial evidence to suggest that national IPO specialist auditors reduce
underpricing.
Other control variables including INDUSTRYSPEC, BIG4, VC, RANK, and PROCEEDS
(all means) differ significantly between the two groups, clients with an IPO specialist auditor and
clients with non-IPO specialist auditors. This result further supports including INDUSTRYSPEC,
BIG4, VC, RANK, and PROCEEDS as control variables in the multivariate analysis.
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Definition of IPO Specialists by Auditor and National and City IPO Specialist
Auditors by Year (Based on the Audit Fees Sample)
IPO Specialist Definition 1: An auditor is defined as a national (city) IPO specialist if it has the
largest annual market share in the IPO market at the U.S. national (city) level and has more than
10% greater market share than the closest competitor. City is defined as the Metropolitan Statistical
Area following the 2005 U.S. Census Bureau MSA definitions.
IPO Specialist Definition 2: An auditor is defined as a national (city) IPO specialist if it has the
largest ratio of market share of IPO clients over market share of total clients at the U.S. national
(city) level, and has more than 10% greater market share than the closest competitor for a given
fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. For a national IPO specialist, I use the top five largest ratio auditors
to have enough observations.
Panel A-1: National IPO Specialists by Year—Definition 1
Fiscal Year
IPO National Specialists
2001
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
2002
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
2003
Ernst & Young LLP
2004
Ernst & Young LLP
2005
Ernst & Young LLP
2006
Ernst & Young LLP
2007
Ernst & Young LLP
2008
Deloitte & Touche LLP
2009
Deloitte & Touche LLP
2010
NA
2011
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
2012
Ernst & Young LLP
2013
Ernst & Young LLP
2014
Ernst & Young LLP
The fiscal year for IPO specialist auditors starts from 2001 and ends 2014 because my sample
consist of firms that went public from January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2015 and the majority of
IPO clients select their auditor a year before they go public. An auditors is defined as a national
IPO specialist if it has the largest annual market share in IPO market at the U.S. national level and
has more than 10% greater market share than the closest competitor. The auditor with the largest
market share in 2010 did not have more than 10% greater market share than the closest competitor
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Ernst & Young LLP

1

3

9

10

9

5

1

1

3

5

4

6

3

3

7

4

3

8

1

4

Panel A-2: City IPO Specialists by Auditor and Year—Definition 1 (Table 3 Continued)
Auditors/Fiscal Years
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
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68

Total

1

16

8

145

1

1

1

1

3

3

11

23

3

3

1

14

1

1

10

1

1

2

12

1

1

1

12

1

3

5

3

2
1

1
1

1

3

2
3

11

1

1

3

16

1

1

2

16

1

1

15

2

2

6

1

1

3

1

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Deloitte & Touche LLP

KPMG LLP
Grant Thornton LLP
McGladrey & Pullen LLP
Baker Tilly Virchow Krause
LLP

BDO USA LLP
De Joya Griffith & Company
LLP
McGladrey LLP
Total City IPO Specialists

An auditor is defined as a city IPO specialist if it has the largest annual market share in the IPO market at the U.S. city level and has more
than 10% greater market share than the closest competitor. City is defined as a Metropolitan Statistical Area following the 2005
U.S. Census Bureau MSA definitions.
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Panel A-3: Top 5 National IPO Specialists by Year—Definition 2 (Table 3 Continued)
2001
2002
2003
Grant Thornton LLP
Stowe & Degon LLC
Singer Lewak Greenbaum & Goldstein
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP Ernst & Young LLP
Deloitte & Touche LLP
Ernst & Young LLP
KPMG LLP
KPMG LLP
Deloitte & Touche LLP
Deloitte & Touche LLP
Ernst & Young LLP
KPMG LLP
Grant Thornton LLP

2004
Rothstein Kass & Company PC
Miller Ray Houser & Stewart LLP
WithumSmith + Brown PC
Tullius Taylor Sartain & Sartain LLP
Aidman Piser & Company PA

2008
Mao & Company CPAs Inc
AGCA Inc

Kempisty & Company CPAs PC
Hansen Barnett & Maxwell PC
Moore Stephens Wurth Frazer
and Torbet LLP

2011
2012
PKF Certified Public Accountants Windes & McClaughry Accountants
Webb & Company PA
ParenteBeard LLC
Gumbiner Savett Inc
KMJ Corbin & Company LLP
Drake & Klein CPAs PA
Lurie Besikof Lapidus & Company LLP
Peterson Sullivan LLP/PLLC
Rosenberg Rich Baker Berman
& Company

2005
2006
2007
Anton Collins Mitchell LLP
Cole & Reed PC
Weiser LLP
Schechter Dokken Kanter
Malin Bergquist & Company LLP Rothstein Kass & Company
PC
Meaden & Moore Ltd
Murrell Hall McIntosh & Co PC Ernst & Young LLP
Crowe Chizek & Company LLP Daszkal Bolton LLP
KPMG LLP
Singer Lewak Greenbaum &
Marcum & Kliegman LLP
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Goldstein
2009
2010
Caturano & Company Inc/PC Baker Tilly Virchow Krause LLP
WT Uniack & Co CPAs PC JH Cohn LLP
Burr Pilger Mayer Inc
SingerLewak LLP
McGladrey & Pullen LLP
EisnerAmper LLP
Jewett, Schwartz, Wolfe & Acquavella, Chiarelli, Shuster &
Associates
Co., LLP

2013
2014
Raich Ende Malter & Co LLP Li & Company PC
Haskell & White LLP
WithumSmith + Brown PC
EFP Rotenberg LLP
CohnReznick LLP
Crowe Horwath LLP
Sadler Gibb & Associates LLC
Mayer Hoffman McCann PC PMB Helin Donovan LLP
An auditor is defined as a national IPO specialist if it has the top five largest ratio of market share of IPO clients over market share of total
clients at the U.S. national level.
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1

1
1
2

3
1

3

9
1
3
2

6 15

11
1
2
1
1

16

8
2
2
2
1
2

17

5
3
2
1
1

12

1

1

1
1
3

Panel A-4: City IPO Specialists by Auditor and Year—Definition 2 (Table 3 Continued)
Auditors/Fiscal Years
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Ernst & Young LLP
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Deloitte & Touche LLP
KPMG LLP
Grant Thornton LLP
McGladrey & Pullen LLP
BDO Seidman LLP
BDO USA LLP
Baker Tilly Virchow Krause LLP
De Joya Griffith & Company LLP
Friedman LLP
KCCW Accountancy Corp.
KMJ Corbin & Company LLP
Mayer Hoffman McCann PC
McGladrey LLP
PKF Certified Public Accountants
Rothstein Kass & Company PC
Total City IPO Specialists

40

5

1

10

5
6
1

1
1

14

7
1
3
2

2
1

1

17

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
3
2
1
1

7
4
1

5
2
4

1

1

13

1

1

12

69
26
22
12
4
3
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
149

2014 Total

4
1

2

1

8

An auditor is defined as a city IPO specialist if it has the largest ratio of market share of IPO clients over market share of total clients at the
U.S. city level, and has more than 10% greater market share than the closest competitor for a given fiscal year, and 0 otherwise.
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(Table 3 continued)
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics For Audit Fee Tests For Full Sample (n =1,226)
IPO Specialist Definition 1: An auditor is defined as a national (city) IPO specialist if it has the largest annual market share in the IPO market
at the U.S. national (city) level and has more than 10% greater market share than the closest competitor. City is defined as a Metropolitan
Statistical Area following the 2005 U.S. Census Bureau MSA definitions.
IPO Specialist Definition 2: An auditor is defined as a national (city) IPO specialist if it has the largest ratio of market share of IPO clients over
market share of total clients at the U.S. national (city) level, and has more than 10% greater market share than the closest competitor for a given
fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. For a national IPO specialist, I use the top five largest ratio auditors to have enough observations.
Definition 1
Definition 2
Non
Non
Non
Non
NAT
NAT
CITY
NAT
NAT
CITY
Test
Test
CITY IPO Test
Test
CITY IPO
Variable
IPO
IPO
IPO
IPO
IPO
IPO
Diff.
Diff.
SPEC Diff.
Diff.
SPEC
SPEC
SPEC
SPEC
SPEC
SPEC
SPEC
pp-value
(n=865) p-value
p-value
(n=871)
(n=364) (n=862)
(n=361)
(n=213) (n=1,013)
(n=355)
value
LNAFEES
Mean
11.020 10.430 0.0604 11.728 10.136 <.0001 10.594 10.607 0.9698
11.755 10.136 <.0001
Median
12.846 12.411 0.0087 13.102 12.253 <.0001 12.032 12.717 0.0001
12.996 12.308 <.0001
STD
4.853
5.097
4.343
5.223
4.365
5.163
4.120
5.289
AUDITFEES
Mean
924.510 783.739 0.0393 1,094.922 713.108 <.0001 491.034 895.868 <.0001 987.605 759.478 0.0022
($thousands)
Median
600.000 455.724 0.0245 650.000 415.000 <.0001 278.500 567.000 <.0001 549.000 455.000 0.1156
STD
1,125.326 1,002.616
1,333.908 869.085
752.020 1,080.519
1,267.604 927.442
INDUSTRYSPEC Mean
0.173
0.179 0.8153
0.540
0.327 <.0001
0.127
0.188 0.0196
0.476
0.355 <.0001
Median
0.000
0.000 0.8152
1.000
0.000 <.0001
0.000
0.000 0.0346
0.000
0.000 <.0001
STD
0.379
0.383
0.499
0.469
0.333
0.391
0.500
0.479
EGC
Mean
0.107
0.081 0.1663
0.072
0.096 0.1575
0.033
0.101 <.0001
0.068
0.098 0.0732
Median
0.000
0.000 0.1450
0.000
0.000 0.1798
0.000
0.000 0.0016
0.000
0.000 0.0945
STD
0.310
0.273
0.259
0.295
0.179
0.301
0.251
0.297
SIZE
Mean
4.735
4.467 0.0310
4.893
4.402 0.0002
4.233
4.612 0.2002
4.765
4.457 0.0211
Median
4.354
4.372 0.9006
4.484
4.320 0.1884
4.151
4.404 0.6803
4.457
4.351 0.4887
STD
1.885
2.209
1.980
2.162
1.984
2.144
2.063
2.139
ASSETS
Mean
608.908 574.719 0.7003 763.955 510.130 0.0137 351.954 633.844 0.0013 697.425 538.995 0.1153
($millions)
Median
77.769 79.183 0.9006 88.628 75.189 0.1884 63.528 81.799 0.2002
86.207 77.540 0.4887
STD
1,470.030 1,399.150
1,778.930 1,233.490
1,071.280 1,478.760
1,705.360 1,284.030
Tests of differences in means is a paired t-test. Tests of differences in medians is a Wilcoxon signed rank test. The sample is 1,226 firmcommitment IPOs from January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2015. All variables are as defined in Appendix.
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(Table 3 Panel B continued)
Definition 1
Definition 2
Non
Non
Non
Non
NAT NAT IPO Test
CITY CITY IPO Test NAT IPO NAT
Test CITY IPO CITY IPO Test
Variable
IPO
SPEC
Diff.
IPO
SPEC
Diff.
SPEC
IPO
Diff.
SPEC
SPEC
Diff.
SPEC (n=862) p-value SPEC (n=865) p-value (n=213)
SPEC p-value (n=355) (n=871) p-value
(n=364)
(n=361)
(n=1,013)
567.724 433.050 0.1084 657.860 395.900 0.0041 325.705 504.014 0.0147 599.331 421.560 0.0464
73.551
73.948 1.0000
80.420
69.086 0.2340
65.468
75.835 0.4072
77.924
71.348 0.4887
1,409.760 1,158.580
1,583.190 1,055.180
879.737 1,300.700
1,523.830 1,099.540
3.928
3.834 0.5705
4.141
3.745 0.0177
3.627
3.911 0.4072
4.036
3.791 0.1447
4.298
4.303 1.0000
4.387
4.235 0.2340
4.182
4.329 0.8047
4.356
4.268 0.4887
2.687
2.654
2.679
2.649
2.612
2.672
2.689
2.651
3.547
3.683 0.4523
3.906
3.533 0.0644
3.723
3.626 0.6483
3.865
3.552 0.1237
3.000
3.000 0.6679
3.000
3.000 0.1080
3.000
3.000 0.0028
3.000
3.000 0.1983
2.774
3.196
3.308
2.969
2.751
3.141
3.316
2.970
0.182
0.209 0.0305
0.197
0.202 0.6930
0.227
0.195 0.0403
0.194
0.203 0.4617
0.126
0.157 0.1692
0.134
0.156 0.1884
0.179
0.139 0.0831
0.133
0.156 0.2317
0.193
0.205
0.196
0.204
0.215
0.199
0.190
0.206
0.172
0.079 0.6585
0.174
0.078 0.7142
-0.020
0.133 0.2457
0.291
0.031 0.3018
0.000
0.000 0.5639
0.000
0.000 0.8890
0.000
0.000 0.2003
0.000
0.000 0.4925
3.532
2.928
4.854
1.992
1.136
3.390
4.514
2.319
0.606
0.541 0.0007
0.588
0.549 0.0434
0.554
0.561 0.7624
0.582
0.551 0.1160
0.678
0.561 0.0124
0.637
0.581 0.0522
0.597
0.601 0.7064
0.631
0.585 0.1156
0.309
0.305
0.308
0.307
0.299
0.310
0.306
0.308
2.640
2.662 0.9522
2.431
2.749 0.3598
3.282
2.524 0.2660
3.457
2.329 0.0907
1.272
1.159 0.0609
1.271
1.165 0.1497
1.319
1.193 0.3273
1.250
1.183 0.4887
3.693
8.838
3.270
8.893
9.355
7.274
12.155
4.744
-0.332
-0.698 0.0341
-0.403
-0.668 0.1916
-1.042
-0.495 0.3756
-0.329
-0.696 0.0332
-0.039
-0.020 0.4534
-0.034
-0.021 0.5730
-0.015
-0.026 0.4977
-0.043
-0.015 0.1156
0.666
4.957
2.331
4.736
8.951
2.065
0.780
4.925
REVENUES Mean
($millions)
Median
STD
LNSALES
Mean
Median
STD
SEGBUS
Mean
Median
STD
INVAR
Mean
Median
STD
FOREIGN
Mean
Median
STD
CATA
Mean
Median
STD
QUICK
Mean
Median
STD
ROA
Mean
Median
STD
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(Table 3 Panel B continued)

Variable

LEV

LOSS

ICW

GCONCERN

NONDEC

BIG4

SECTIER

LIT

Mean
Median
STD
Mean
Median
STD
Mean
Median
STD
Mean
Median
STD
Mean
Median
STD
Mean
Median
STD
Mean
Median
STD
Mean
Median
STD

Definition 1
Definition 2
Non
Non
Non
Non
NAT
NAT
Test
CITY
CITY Test
NAT
NAT
Test CITY
CITY
IPO
IPO
Diff.
IPO
IPO
Diff.
IPO
IPO
Diff.
IPO
IPO
SPEC
SPEC p-value SPEC
SPEC p-value SPEC
SPEC p-value SPEC SPEC
(n=364) (n=862)
(n=361) (n=865)
(n=213) (n=1,013)
(n=355) (n=871)
0.377
0.546 0.0728
0.377
0.545 0.0745
0.744
0.443 0.3779
0.400
0.534
0.225
0.290 0.0802
0.210
0.294 0.0048
0.271
0.274 0.8212
0.223
0.292
0.632
2.577
0.654
2.571
4.961
0.794
0.764
2.551
0.588
0.580 0.7988
0.596
0.577 0.5457
0.596
0.579 0.6521
0.625
0.565
1.000
1.000 0.7987
1.000
1.000 0.5455
1.000
1.000 0.6519
1.000
1.000
0.493
0.494
0.491
0.494
0.492
0.494
0.485
0.496
0.003
0.016 0.0084
0.003
0.016 0.0088
0.019
0.011 0.4233
0.003
0.016
0.000
0.000 0.0497
0.000
0.000 0.0516
0.000
0.000 0.3394
0.000
0.000
0.052
0.126
0.053
0.126
0.136
0.104
0.053
0.126
0.082
0.104 0.2171
0.086
0.103 0.3611
0.075
0.103 0.1791
0.082
0.104
0.000
0.000 0.2366
0.000
0.000 0.3609
0.000
0.000 0.2189
0.000
0.000
0.275
0.306
0.281
0.304
0.264
0.304
0.274
0.306
0.165
0.200 0.1567
0.177
0.194 0.4906
0.169
0.193 0.4076
0.183
0.192
0.000
0.000 0.1566
0.000
0.000 0.4904
0.000
0.000 0.4074
0.000
0.000
0.372
0.400
0.382
0.396
0.376
0.395
0.387
0.394
1.000
0.700 <.0001
0.964
0.716 <.0001
0.690
0.809 0.0005
0.901
0.743
1.000
1.000 <.0001
1.000
1.000 <.0001
1.000
1.000 0.0001
1.000
1.000
0.000
0.459
0.187
0.451
0.464
0.393
0.299
0.437
0.000
0.081 <.0001
0.017
0.074 <.0001
0.019
0.065 <.0001
0.031
0.068
0.000
0.000 <.0001
0.000
0.000 <.0001
0.000
0.000 0.0080
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.273
0.128
0.262
0.136
0.247
0.174
0.251
0.602
0.501 0.0013
0.576
0.512 0.0406
0.432
0.552 0.0014
0.566
0.517
1.000
1.000 0.0013
1.000
1.000 0.0406
0.000
1.000 0.0014
1.000
1.000
0.490
0.500
0.495
0.500
0.497
0.498
0.496
0.500
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Test
Diff.
p-value

0.1594
0.0276

0.0515
0.0515

0.0096
0.0556

0.2027
0.2235

0.1150
0.1150

0.0035
0.0119

<.0001
<.0001

0.7265
0.7264
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(Table 3 Panel B continued)

Variable

LNPROCEEDS

PROCEEDS
($millions)
ATURN

ROALOSS

O_SCORE

VC

PRESTIGE

SEGGEO

Mean
Median
STD
Mean
Median
STD
Mean
Median
STD
Mean
Median
STD
Mean
Median
STD
Mean
Median
STD
Mean
Median
STD
Mean
Median
STD

NAT
IPO
SPEC
(n=364)
4.731
4.605
0.869
170.848
100.000
220.612
1.031
0.793
1.214
0.585
1.000
0.493
0.966
0.280
5.249
0.591
1.000
0.492
0.610
1.000
0.488
3.962
3.000
5.747

Definition 1
Non
NAT
Test
CITY
IPO
Diff.
IPO
SPEC p-value SPEC
(n=862)
(n=361)
4.519 0.0006
4.781
4.522 0.2607
4.589
1.229
1.057
173.515 0.8511 202.566
92.000 0.2607 98.400
242.180
286.621
1.139 0.1569
1.103
0.829 0.4534
0.822
1.227
1.196
0.553 0.3055
0.593
1.000 0.3053
1.000
0.497
0.492
2.157 0.0025
0.935
0.367 0.6172
0.081
8.211
5.362
0.426 <.0001
0.565
0.000 <.0001
1.000
0.495
0.496
0.429 <.0001
0.571
0.000 <.0001
1.000
0.495
0.496
4.053 0.7884
4.332
3.000 0.1371
3.000
5.351
5.420
Non
CITY Test
IPO
Diff.
SPEC p-value
(n=865)
4.498 <.0001
4.522 0.2340
1.161
160.268 0.0116
92.000 0.2340
210.096
1.109 0.9332
0.809 0.8510
1.236
0.550 0.1717
1.000 0.1716
0.498
2.166 0.0019
0.413 0.1174
8.170
0.437 <.0001
0.000 <.0001
0.496
0.446 <.0001
0.000 <.0001
0.497
3.898 0.2054
3.000 0.1099
5.488
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Definition 2
Non
Non
NAT
NAT
Test CITY
CITY
IPO
IPO
Diff.
IPO
IPO
SPEC
SPEC p-value SPEC SPEC
(n=213) (n=1,013)
(n=355) (n=871)
4.257
4.650 <.0001
4.733
4.520
4.357
4.585 0.0129
4.613
4.512
1.190
1.115
1.186
1.113
135.534 180.542 0.0044 198.827 162.083
78.000
98.000 0.0129 100.800 91.100
200.552 242.036
279.766 214.743
1.184
1.091 0.3152
1.081
1.118
0.953
0.796 0.2002
0.812
0.813
1.238
1.220
1.174
1.244
0.577
0.560 0.6355
0.611
0.543
1.000
1.000 0.6353
1.000
1.000
0.495
0.497
0.488
0.498
1.366
1.896 0.3473
1.280
4.635
0.027
0.381 0.2584
0.227
0.369
7.642
7.438
7.578 63.364
0.394
0.492 0.0098
0.541
0.448
0.000
0.000 0.0098
1.000
0.000
0.490
0.500
0.499
0.498
0.390
0.502 0.0027
0.600
0.435
0.000
1.000 0.0028
1.000
0.000
0.489
0.500
0.491
0.496
3.812
4.071 0.4985
4.110
3.992
3.000
3.000 0.5892
3.000
3.000
4.956
5.572
5.380
5.508

Test
Diff.
p-value

0.0029
0.0892

0.0267
0.0892

0.6358
0.9498

0.0290
0.0290

0.7323
0.7957

<.0001
<.0001

0.0031
0.0031

0.1249
0.4887
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Non
NAT
NAT
IPO
IPO
SPEC SPEC
(n=319) (n=703)
0.138 0.146
0.083 0.071
0.272 0.272
0.182 0.182
0.000 0.000
0.386 0.386
1.000 0.734
1.000 1.000
0.000 0.442
0.110 0.083
0.000 0.000
0.313 0.275
0.592 0.438
1.000 0.000
0.492 0.497
8.333 7.678
9.001 8.501
1.251 2.057
-0.021 -0.019
0.000 0.000
0.142 0.138
0.010 0.012
0.010 0.010
0.005 0.013

(Table 3 continued)
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics For Underpricing Tests (n =1,022)
Definition 1
Non
Test
CITY CITY
Variable
Diff.
IPO
IPO
p-value SPEC SPEC
(n=308) (n=714)
0.6786 0.146 0.143
UNDERPRICING
0.4172 0.083 0.069
0.292 0.263
INDUSTRYSPEC
<.0001 0.552 0.340
<.0001 1.000 0.000
0.498 0.474
<.0001 0.968 0.752
BIG4
<.0001 1.000 1.000
0.178 0.432
0.1821 0.071 0.099
EGC
0.1612 0.000 0.000
0.258 0.299
<.0001 0.562 0.454
VC
<.0001 1.000 0.000
0.497 0.498
RANK
<.0001 8.353 7.680
<.0001 9.001 8.501
1.279 2.039
REVISION
0.7843 -0.014 -0.022
0.5850 0.000 0.000
0.138 0.140
0.0004 0.010 0.012
SPREAD
0.6367 0.009 0.010
0.008 0.012
Mean
Median
STD
Mean
Median
STD
Mean
Median
STD
Mean
Median
STD
Mean
Median
STD
Mean
Median
STD
Mean
Median
STD
Mean
Median
STD
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Non
Test
NAT
NAT
Diff.
IPO
IPO
p-value SPEC SPEC
(n=171) (n=851)
0.8765 0.102 0.152
0.1721 0.071 0.075
0.182 0.286
<.0001 0.135 0.192
<.0001 0.000 0.000
0.342 0.394
<.0001 0.743 0.832
<.0001 1.000 1.000
0.438 0.374
0.1301 0.029 0.103
0.1533 0.000 0.000
0.169 0.305
0.0015 0.392 0.505
0.0015 0.000 1.000
0.490 0.500
<.0001 7.419 7.976
0.0007 8.001 9.001
2.133 1.797
0.4360 -0.005 -0.022
0.3737 0.000 0.000
0.127 0.141
0.0012 0.013 0.011
0.5857 0.011 0.009
0.016 0.010

Definition 2
Non
Test
CITY CITY
Diff.
IPO
IPO
p-value SPEC SPEC
(n=298) (n=724)
0.0040 0.133 0.148
0.9331 0.077 0.072
0.277 0.270
0.0099 0.493 0.367
0.0099 0.000 0.000
0.501 0.482
0.0136 0.916 0.776
0.0059 1.000 1.000
0.278 0.417
<.0001 0.064 0.102
0.0021 0.000 0.000
0.245 0.303
0.0067 0.530 0.468
0.0068 1.000 0.000
0.500 0.499
0.0016 8.291 7.714
0.0246 9.001 8.501
1.498 1.977
0.1374 -0.012 -0.022
0.7942 0.000 0.000
0.130 0.143
0.0313 0.010 0.011
0.0786 0.009 0.010
0.011 0.012

Test
Diff.
p-value

0.4258
0.5814

0.0002
0.0002

<.0001
<.0001

0.1575
0.0987

0.2944
0.3756

<.0001
<.0001

0.0718
0.0718

0.0341
0.0522
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(Table 3 Panel C continued)

Definition 1
Definition 2
Non
Non
Non
Non
NAT NAT
Test
CITY
CITY
Test
NAT
NAT
Test
CITY
CITY
Test
IPO
IPO
Diff.
IPO
IPO
Diff.
IPO
IPO
Diff.
IPO
IPO
Diff.
Variable
SPEC SPEC p-value SPEC SPEC p-value SPEC
SPEC p-value SPEC SPEC p-value
(n=319 (n=703)
(n=308) (n=714)
(n=171) (n=851)
(n=298) (n=724)
)
TECH
Mean
0.226
0.238 0.6788
0.263
0.221 0.1487
0.275
0.226 0.1654
0.245
0.229 0.5907
Median 0.000
0.000 0.6786
0.000
0.000 0.1486
0.000
0.000 0.1653
0.000
0.000 0.5905
STD
0.419
0.426
0.441
0.415
0.448
0.418
0.431
0.421
VWTOT
Mean
0.019
0.024 0.0324
0.025
0.021 0.1849
0.018
0.023 0.2425
0.025
0.022 0.2053
Median 0.019
0.026 0.0365
0.028
0.024 0.5857
0.024
0.024 0.9332
0.026
0.024 0.5821
STD
0.043
0.040
0.039
0.042
0.053
0.038
0.039
0.042
IPORET
Mean
14.686 14.727 0.9311 14.508 14.803 0.5243 13.675
14.923 0.0179 14.282 14.892 0.2134
Median 13.750 13.700 0.6801 13.725 13.700 0.7359 13.500
13.700 0.6737 13.600 13.750 0.4499
STD
6.863
7.252
6.506
7.385
6.018
7.318
6.744
7.279
IPOTOT
Mean
24.401 23.572 0.2403 24.383 23.592 0.2676 22.006
24.197 0.0123 23.960 23.778 0.8004
Median 25.000 23.000 0.0233 25.000 24.000 0.3771 21.000
25.000 0.0049 24.500 24.000 0.6872
STD
9.873 10.711
10.392 10.485
10.357
10.447
10.286 10.535
LNAGE
Mean
2.498
2.391 0.1228
2.515
2.385 0.0623
2.323
2.445 0.1779
2.492
2.397 0.1778
Median 2.303
2.398 0.5058
2.398
2.398 0.6766
2.303
2.398 0.4419
2.398
2.398 0.8150
STD
0.980
1.120
0.977
1.119
1.149
1.064
0.996
1.111
PROCEEDS
Mean
-0.603 -0.731 0.0494 -0.529 -0.761 0.0011 -0.885
-0.653 0.0081 -0.534 -0.756 0.0020
Median -0.806 -0.780 0.6364 -0.755 -0.802 0.3396 -0.784
-0.791 0.8014 -0.739 -0.813 0.1685
STD
0.890
1.110
0.982
1.067
1.080
1.037
1.069
1.032
Tests of differences in means is a paired t-test. Tests of differences in medians is a Wilcoxon signed rank test. The sample is 1,022 firmcommitment IPOs from January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2015. All variables are as defined in Appendix.

46

45

Table 4, Panel A and Table 4, Panel B presents a Pearson and Spearman correlation matrix
for my audit fee variables and underpricing variables, respectively. I report the Pearson correlation
coefficients above the diagonal and Spearman correlation coefficients below the diagonal. Bolded
coefficients are significant at the five percent level.
The Pearson correlations between IPO specialists and audit fees are 0.05 (national level
definition 1), 0.14 (city level definition 1), 0.00 (national level definition 2), and 0.15 (city level
definition 2), indicating that overall there is no linear correlation between IPO specialists and audit
fees. The Pearson correlations between IPO specialists and underpricing are -0.01 (national level
definition 1), 0.01 (city level definition 1),
-0.07 (national level definition 2), and -0.02 (city level definition 2), indicating that overall there
is no linear correlation between IPO specialists and underpricing. The Pearson correlations results
and univariate test results together suggest that multivariate regression tests should be conducted
to make inferences for my H1 and H2.
The Pearson correlations between IPO specialists at the U.S. national level and industry
specialists at the U.S. national level are -0.01 (definition 1) and -0.06 (definition 2), suggesting
that national IPO specialist are not positively correlated with national industry specialists. The
Pearson correlations between IPO specialists at the U.S. city level and industry specialists at the
U.S. city level are 0.20 (definition 1) and 0.11 (definition 2), indicating that there is a weak
correlation between city IPO specialists and city industry specialists. None of the variance inflation
factors on any of the variables exceeds five, which is below the threshold of ten recommended by
Kennedy (1992) to test for multicollinearity.
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Table 4.
Panel A: Pearson/Spearman Correlation Matrix for Audit Fees Tests
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This table presents the Pearson correlation coefficients above the diagonal and Spearman correlation coefficients below the diagonal. Bolded
coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level. The sample contains 1,226 firm-year observations. Variables are defined in Appendix. None
of the variance inflation factors on any of the variables exceeds 5, which is below the threshold of 10 recommended by Kennedy (1992) to test
for multicollinearity.
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Panel B: Pearson/Spearman Correlation Matrix for Underpricing Tests (Table 4-Continued)

49

This table presents the Pearson correlation coefficients above the diagonal and Spearman correlation coefficients below the diagonal. Bolded
coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level. The sample contains 1,022 firm-year observations. Variables are defined in Appendix. None
of the variance inflation factors on any of the variables exceeds 3.5, which is below the threshold of 10 recommended by Kennedy (1992) to
test for multicollinearity.
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Results of my audit fee tests are reported in Table 5. My test variable is IPOSPEC. The
coefficients on IPOSPEC are positive and statistically significant in all four models (national IPO
specialist using definition one, city IPO specialist using definition one, national IPO specialist
using definition two, city IPO specialist using definition two) and are consistent with my
expectations. These significant positive coefficients on IPOSPEC support my first hypothesis that
IPO clients with an IPO specialist auditor pay higher audit fees compared to clients with non-IPO
specialists.
Using my first measure of specialization, national IPO specialists charge 78% higher audit
fees than non-national IPO specialists, while city IPO specialists charge 141% higher audit fees
than non-city IPO specialists. Using my second measure of specialization, national IPO specialists
charge 272% higher audit fees than non-national IPO specialists, while city IPO specialists charge
173% higher audit fees than non-city IPO specialists.15 These results demonstrate the economic
significance of IPO specialists. My adjusted R2s range from 36% to 37% which are comparable to
previous IPO audit fee studies (adjusted R2s in Venkataraman et al. (2008) range from 31% to 38%
and the adjusted R2 in Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) is 26%).
The coefficients on INDUSTRYSPEC, SIZE, LOSS, ICW, and SECTIER in my city models
are positive and statistically significant, suggesting that audit fees are higher for firms that are
audited from an industry city specialist audit office, are larger, reported a net loss, reported internal
control weaknesses, and/or were audited from second tier audit firms. The coefficients on
FOREIGN and NONDEC are negative and statistically significant, suggesting that audit fees are
lower for clients with foreign incomes and/or without a December 31st fiscal year-end.

The interpretation of coefficients is the following: %∆ 𝑦 = 100(𝑒 𝛽1 − 1) when 𝛽1 ≤ -0.1 and
𝛽1 ≥ 0.1 (Craswell et al. 1995).
15
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Table 5. Regression of Multivariate Analysis (Dependent Variable: LNAFEES)
Definition 1
Definition 2
National
City
National
City
Variable
Coefficient P-value
Coefficient P-value
Coefficient P-value
Coefficient P-value
Intercept
3.562 0.059*`
3.610 0.054*
3.438 0.068*
3.388 0.070*
IPOSPEC
0.577 0.043**
0.880 0.001***
1.315 0.010**
1.005 0.000***
INDUSTRYSPEC
0.148 0.650
0.706 0.007***
0.110 0.735
0.769 0.003***
EGC
-0.390 0.478
-0.290 0.596
-0.366 0.505
-0.234 0.668
SIZE
0.458 0.001***
0.441 0.001***
0.431 0.001***
0.457 0.001***
LNSALES
0.081 0.484
0.068 0.552
0.083 0.471
0.070 0.542
SEGBUS
0.007 0.881
-0.005 0.902
0.009 0.834
-0.005 0.904
INVAR
0.083 0.927
0.096 0.914
0.011 0.990
0.082 0.927
FOREIGN
-0.092 0.015**
-0.093 0.013**
-0.090 0.016**
-0.097 0.009***
CATA
-0.317 0.625
-0.333 0.604
-0.321 0.620
-0.314 0.624
QUICK
-0.018 0.312
-0.020 0.260
-0.020 0.269
-0.026 0.138
ROA
0.020 0.765
0.027 0.682
0.023 0.730
0.016 0.809
LEV
0.063 0.595
0.074 0.530
0.053 0.660
0.055 0.640
LOSS
0.634 0.037**
0.546 0.070*
0.570 0.060*
0.503 0.095*
ICW
3.266 0.006
3.316 0.005
3.354 0.005
3.324 0.005***
***
***
***
GCONCERN
-0.360 0.443
-0.391 0.402
-0.255 0.587
-0.382 0.412
NONDEC
-2.112 <.0001***
-2.185 <.0001***
-2.123 <.0001***
-2.197 <.0001***
BIG4
-0.194 0.660
-0.417 0.334
0.467 0.309
-0.378 0.377
SECTIER
1.213 0.049**
1.110 0.070*
1.682 0.009***
1.085 0.076*
LIT
0.264 0.492
0.317 0.405
0.269 0.484
0.316 0.407
-0.232 0.177
-0.226 0.186
-0.223 0.195
-0.246 0.149
LNPROCEEDS
YEAR & INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECT
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Adj. R2
0.3599
0.3683
0.3618
0.3704
N
1,226
1,226
1,226
1,226
*, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Bolded variables are the variables of interest. The
dependent variable is LNAFEES. The sample contains 1,226 firm-year observations. The sample period covers from 2001 to 2015. Year and industry
(based on 2-digit SIC codes) are included in the model. My adjusted R2s are comparable to previous IPO and audit fee studies (adjusted R2s in
Venkataraman et al. (2008) range from 30.9 to 38% and adjusted R2 in Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) is 26%).
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Results of my audit fee tests using the propensity score matching (PSM) method tests are
reported in Table 6. I also evaluate whether covariates are balanced and report these results in
Table 6. All twenty-five of the covariates (twenty-four covariates for city IPO specialist using
definition one and national IPO specialist using definition two) are insignificantly different
between IPO specialist clients and non-IPO specialist clients after matching.16 These results
suggest that the covariate balance substantially improves in the matched sample.
The coefficients on IPOSPEC, the test variable, are again positive and statistically
significant in all four models. These results are consistent with the results from my OLS models.
These significant positive coefficients on IPOSPEC support my first hypothesis that IPO clients
with an IPO specialist auditor pay higher audit fees compared to clients with non-IPO specialists
after controlling for a self-selection bias issue. Economically, using my first measure of
specialization, national IPO specialists charge 177% higher audit fees than non-national IPO
specialists, while city IPO specialists charge 86% higher audit fees than non-city IPO specialists.
Using my second measure of specialization, national IPO specialists charge 755% higher audit
fees than non-national IPO specialists, while city IPO specialists charge 96% higher audit fees than
non-city IPO specialists.
Results from my underpricing tests are reported in Table 7. My test variable is IPOSPEC.
The coefficients on IPOSPEC are negative and statistically significant in three out of four models
(city IPO specialist using definition one, national IPO specialist using definition two and city IPO
specialist using definition two). These results support my second hypothesis that IPO clients with
an IPO specialist auditor will exhibit lower levels of first-day underpricing.

16

I evaluate covariate balance using the same set of nineteen covariates from equation (1) and 6
covariates from equation (3).
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Table 6. Regression of Multivariate Analysis for Matched Sample (Dependent Variable: LNAFEES)
Definition 1
Definition 2
National
City
National
City
Variable
Coefficient P-value
Coefficient P-value
Coefficient P-value
Coefficient P-value
Intercept
-1.072 0.605
-1.044 0.602
1.891
0.365
2.400 0.162
IPOSPEC
1.020 0.002***
0.623 0.035**
2.146
0.002***
0.674 0.018**
INDUSTRYSPEC
0.317 0.442
0.500 0.101
-1.273
0.032**
-0.145 0.626
EGC
-0.725 0.310
0.048 0.950
-0.508
0.667
-0.665 0.346
SIZE
0.357 0.078*
0.861 <.0001***
0.465
0.054*
0.503 0.004***
LNSALES
0.093 0.601
-0.012 0.937
0.078
0.771
0.251 0.210
SEGBUS
-0.014 0.817
-0.065 0.165
-0.075
0.746
0.048 0.752
INVAR
-1.263 0.350
0.435 0.717
0.737
0.607
-0.647 0.579
FOREIGN
-0.195 0.001***
-0.075 0.062*
-0.067
0.423
-0.045 0.284
1.108 0.220
0.564 0.532
-0.381
0.734
0.148 0.860
CATA
QUICK
-0.012 0.800
-0.048 0.287
-0.033
0.226
-0.013 0.439
ROA
0.215 0.531
0.025 0.796
0.065
0.704
-0.104 0.705
LEV
0.197 0.279
1.604 0.048**
0.019
0.952
0.101 0.711
LOSS
-0.008 0.985
0.869 0.018*
0.531
0.301
0.653 0.079*
-0.457 0.916
7.928 0.001***
2.064
0.404
5.246 0.052*
ICW
GCONCERN
0.116 0.856
-0.242 0.700
0.491
0.617
0.005 0.994
NONDEC
-2.333 <.0001***
-2.847 <.0001***
-1.563
0.009***
-2.302 <.0001***
1.068 0.380
2.310
0.002
-0.309 0.654
BIG4
***
SECTIER
3.593 0.020**
4.464
0.009***
0.925 0.356
1.031 0.050**
-0.262 0.567
0.411
0.476
0.362 0.436
LIT
LNPROCEEDS
0.088 0.748
-0.376 0.147
-0.169
0.541
-0.205 0.368
YEAR & INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECT
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Covariates Balanced
25/25
24/25
24/25
25/25
Adj. R
0.4554
0.3969
0.2981
0.4231
N
728
722
426
710
*, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Bolded variables are the variables
of interest. The dependent variable is LNAFEES. The sample are matched by the propensity score. Year and industry (based on 2digit SIC codes) are included in the mode. My adjusted R2s are comparable to previous IPO and audit fee studies (adjusted R2s in
Venkataraman et al. (2008) range from 30.9 to 38% and adjusted R2 in Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) is 26%).
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Economically, on average, IPO specialists reduced underpricing worth $3.8 million (city
IPO specialists definition 1), $6.2 million (national IPO specialists definition 2), and $6.7 million
(city IPO specialists definition 2).
The coefficients on EGC, VC, RANK, REVISION, SPREAD, VWTOT and IPOTOT in my
underpricing models are positive and statistically significant, suggesting that there is higher
underpricing for firms that are emerging growth companies, are backed by venture capital, hire a
more prestigious underwriter, have a higher price revision from the book building process, have a
higher fraction of underwriters’ fees over proceeds, and/or go public during a hot IPO market.
Results of my underpricing tests using the propensity score matching (PSM) method are
reported in Table 8. I also evaluate whether covariates are balanced and report these results in
Table 8. Sixteen covariates out of eighteen covariates are insignificantly different between IPO
specialist clients and non-IPO specialist clients after matching.17 These results suggest that the
covariate balance substantially improves in the matched sample.
The coefficients on IPOSPEC are negative and statistically significant in three out of four
models (city IPO specialist using definition one, national IPO specialist using definition two and
city IPO specialist using definition two). These results are consistent with results from my OLS
models and support my second hypothesis that IPO clients with an IPO specialist auditor will
exhibit lower levels of first-day underpricing. Economically, on average, IPO specialists reduced
underpricing worth $6.9 million (city IPO specialists definition 1), $6.6 million (national IPO
specialists definition 2), and $8.3 million (city IPO specialists definition 2).

17

I evaluate covariate balance using the same set of fourteen covariates from equation (2) and 4
covariates from equation (3) after eliminating the same covariates in the two equations.
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Definition 1
City

National

Definition 2

Table 7. Regression of Multivariate Analysis for Full Sample (Dependent Variable: UNDERPRICING)
National

City

Robust
Robust
Robust
Robust
Variable
Coefficient
Coefficient
Coefficient
Coefficient
t-statistics
t-statistics
t-statistics
t-statistics
Intercept
-0.204
-2.36**
-0.200
-2.35**
-0.181
-2.06**
-0.198
-2.37**
IPOSPEC
-0.031
-1.36
-0.021
-1.96*
-0.039
-2.32**
-0.037
-2.35**
0.011
0.80
-0.014
-0.95
0.013
0.89
-0.014
-0.98
INDUSTRYSPEC
0.004
0.14
0.004
0.18
-0.009
-0.37
0.004
0.17
BIG4
EGC
0.080
2.12
0.076
2.06
0.072
1.97
0.075
2.03**
**
*
*
VC
0.054
2.91***
0.053
2.87***
0.049
2.65***
0.053
2.90***
RANK
0.031
2.93***
0.030
2.93***
0.030
2.84***
0.031
2.95***
REVISION
0.752
9.37***
0.747
9.30***
0.762
9.65***
0.747
9.33***
SPREAD
2.670
1.65*
2.746
1.69*
2.658
1.66*
2.874
1.76*
TECH
-0.001
-0.04
-0.001
-0.03
0.001
0.07
-0.001
-0.06
VWTOT
0.280
1.93*
0.322
2.15**
0.272
1.86**
0.331
2.21**
IPORET
0.000
0.44
0.000
0.43
0.000
0.23
0.000
0.35
IPOTOT
0.002
2.74***
0.002
2.85***
0.001
2.51**
0.002
2.83***
LNAGE
0.004
0.66
0.005
0.71
0.003
0.53
0.004
0.66
PROCEEDS
-0.006
-0.50
-0.004
-0.35
-0.007
-0.59
-0.003
-0.25
YEAR& INDUSTRY
YES
YES
YES
YES
CLUSTERING
Adj. R2
0.2067
0.2059
0.2071
0.2085
N
1,022
1,022
1,022
1,022
*, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Bolded variables are the variables of interest.
The dependent variable is Underpricing. The sample contains 1,022 firm-year observations. The sample period covers from 2001 to 2015.
Robust t-statistics are adjusted for clustering of observations across years and 2-digit industry code (Fama-French industry category) to address
correlations among standard errors.
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Definition 2

Table 8. Regression of Multivariate Analysis for Matched Sample (Dependent Variable: UNDERPRICING)
Definition 1

National
City
National
City
Robust
Robust
Robust
Robust
Variable
Coefficient
tCoefficient
tCoefficient
Coefficient
t-statistics
t-statistics
statistics
statistics
Intercept
-0.373
-1.68*
-0.390
-1.35
0.018
0.26
-0.263
-0.99
IPOSPEC
-0.037
-1.15
-0.038
-2.90***
-0.042
-1.93*
-0.046
-3.10***
INDUSTRYSPEC
0.034
1.86*
-0.013
-0.58
-0.024
-0.97
-0.031
-1.40
BIG4
0.007
0.18
0.015
0.50
-0.002
-0.05
-0.031
-0.69
EGC
0.067
1.65**
0.097
1.69*
0.126
1.52
0.055
0.71
VC
0.066
3.07***
0.058
2.27**
0.048
1.93*
0.042
1.32
RANK
0.052
2.14
0.054
1.86
0.016
2.86
0.043
1.32
**
*
***
REVISION
0.857
10.30***
0.886
11.67***
0.592
2.69***
0.919
9.67***
SPREAD
6.673
1.28
2.602
0.62
1.930
1.36
2.680
0.66
TECH
-0.018
-0.73
-0.018
-0.98
0.019
0.68
-0.008
-0.28
VWTOT
0.041
0.26
-0.036
-0.17
0.482
1.79*
0.072
0.25
IPORET
0.000
-0.40
0.000
-0.52
-0.003
-1.51
0.000
-0.33
IPOTOT
0.002
2.59**
0.003
4.03***
0.000
-0.30
0.002
1.93*
LNAGE
-0.006
-0.58
0.000
0.02
0.003
0.23
0.016
1.74*
PROCEEDS
0.016
0.62
-0.014
-0.83
0.007
0.38
-0.026
-1.31
YEAR& INDUSTRY
YES
YES
YES
YES
CLUSTERING
Covariates Balanced
16/18
16/18
16/18
16/18
Adj. R2
0.2515
0.2686
0.1501
0.2278
N
638
616
342
596
*, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Bolded variables are the variables of interest.
The dependent variable is Underpricing. The sample period covers from 2001 to 2015. Robust t-statistics are adjusted for clustering of
observations across years and 2-digit industry code (Fama-French industry category) to address correlations among standard error.
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CHAPTER 6
ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS
I also reclassify my IPO specialist variable using a rolling three year window prior to IPO
issue date. In my OLS audit fees tests, the coefficients on IPOSPEC, the test variable, are positive
and statistically significant in three models (0.91 (t=2.94) for national IPO specialists using
definition 1, 1.40 (t=4.72) for city IPO specialists using definition 1, 0.43 (t=1.03) for national IPO
specialists using definition 2, and 1.08 (t=3.75) for city IPO specialists using definition 2). In my
PSM audit fees tests, the coefficients on IPOSPEC, the test variable, are positive and statistically
significant in all models (0.83 (t=3.10) for national IPO specialists using definition 1, 0.67 (t=2.54)
for city IPO specialists using definition 1, 2.10 (t=3.17) for national IPO specialists using definition
2, and 0.87 (t=3.38) for city IPO specialists using definition 2).
In my underpricing tests, the coefficients on IPOSPEC, the test variable, are negative and
statistically significant in all models (-0.04 (t=-1.98) for national IPO specialists using definition
1, -0.02 (t=-1.86) for city IPO specialists using definition 1, -0.03 (t=-1.80) for national IPO
specialists using definition 2, and -0.02 (t=-1.46) for city IPO specialists using definition 2). In my
PSM underpricing tests, the coefficients on IPOSPEC, the test variable, are negative and
statistically significant in three models (-0.05 (t=-1.98) for national IPO specialists using definition
1, -0.03 (t=-2.03) for city IPO specialists using definition 1, -0.06 (t=-1.95) for national IPO
specialists using definition 2, and -0.02 (t=-0.81) for city IPO specialists using definition 2). These
results using a rolling three year window prove additional support that IPO specialist auditors earn
fee premiums while reducing underpricing.
In my study, I also seek to better understand whether IPO specialist auditors provide
higher audit quality. Audit specialists are believed to be better able to deliver higher audit quality
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because they possess a deeper knowledge of business and accounting practices than nonspecialist auditors, suggesting that specialists have greater competency in providing high quality
audits (Dopuch and Simunic 1982; Reichelt and Wang 2010). I use restatements and
discretionary accruals to examine the audit quality of IPO specialist auditors. Results of my
restatement and discretionary accrual tests show that the coefficients of IPO specialist auditors
are negative but not statistically significant.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
In this paper, I examine auditor specialization in the IPO market and then investigate the
pricing of IPO auditor expertise and the issuer underpricing of IPO auditor expertise. I find that
IPO clients with an IPO specialist auditor pay higher audit fees compared to clients with non-IPO
specialists using both the traditional OLS regression and the propensity score matching method.
When an audit firm is a national IPO audit specialist, I document significant fee premiums of 78
percent using an IPO market share measure and 272 percent using an IPO market concentration
measure. Additionally, when an audit office is a city IPO audit specialist, I document significant
fee premiums of 141 percent using an IPO market share measure and 173 percent using an IPO
market concentration measure. I also document evidence that IPO clients with an IPO specialist
auditor are associated with lower levels of first-day underpricing. Specifically, city IPO specialists
using an IPO market share measure, national IPO specialists using an IPO market concentration
measure and city IPO specialists using an IPO market concentration measure reduce first-day
issuer underpricing by 2.1 percent, 3.9 percent and 3.7 percent, respectively.
Results from my study contribute to both the auditor specialization literature and the IPO
audit literature by investigating auditor IPO specialization within the IPO audit market. I detail
that prior auditor specialization literature only focuses on industry wide auditor specialization and
does not distinguish between pre-IPO audits and post-IPO audits. While prior IPO audit literature
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demonstrates that Big4 audit firms of IPO issuers earn higher fees and that the increased litigation
risk imposed on auditors in pre-IPO audits leads to higher audit quality, no study has linked IPO
auditor specialization and audit fees. In addition, I also contribute to the auditing literature by
finding that IPO auditor specialization is associated with reduced levels of underpricing.
Additionally, my study also provides useful information to IPO market participants, such
as auditors, issuers, regulators, and investors. For auditors, a better understanding of audit pricing
in the IPO market should provide audit firms with practical information as they develop business
strategies to differentiate themselves from other audit firms in the course of becoming an IPO
specialist auditor. For issuers, private companies considering an IPO should benefit from knowing
the costs and the benefits of hiring IPO specialist auditors and which auditors differentiate
themselves within the IPO market. Regulators including the PCAOB will be able to use the results
from my study during their audit firm inspections because my analysis provides evidence of
auditor specialization within the IPO audit market. Also, I provide evidence that IPO specialized
auditors exert more effort (higher audit fees) which should help regulators to better understand the
role auditors (specialists and non-specialists) play in enforcing requirements in the IPO market as
a result of my study. Lastly, for potential investors, it should be beneficial information to know
that IPO specialist auditors have some effect on the value of the underlying security.
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APPENDIX
Variable Definitions
Variable
LNAFEES

IPOSPEC
INDUSTRYSPEC
(National level)
INDUSTRYSPEC
(City level)

EGC

SIZE
LNSALES
SEGBUS
SEGGEO
INVAR
FOREIGN
CATA
QUICK
ROA
LEV
LOSS
ICW
GCONCERN
NONDEC

Definition
the natural log of a firm’s annual audit fees which consist in all fees
necessary to perform the audit or review in accordance with GAAS.
This category also may include services that generally only the
independent accountant reasonably can provide, such as comfort
letters, statutory audits, attest services, consents and assistance with
and review of documents filed with the SEC;
an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if an auditor is an IPO
specialist auditor, and 0 otherwise;
1 if auditors have the largest annual market share in a given industry
at the U.S. national level (the entire audit analytics sample) and have
more than 10% greater market share than the closest competitor, and
0 otherwise.
1 if auditors that have the largest annual market share in a given
industry at the U.S. city level (the entire audit analytics sample) ,
where city is defined as a Metropolitan Statistical Area following the
2005U.S. Census Bureau MSA definitions, and have more than 10%
greater market share than the closest competitor, and 0 otherwise.
an indicator variable which take the value one if the client is an
emerging growth company whose annual revenues are less than $1
billion, and zero otherwise;
the natural log of a client’s total assets (AT);
the natural log of total sales (SALE);
the natural log of the number of unique business segments;
the natural log of the number of unique geographical segments in a
ﬁrm;
sum of inventory (INVT)and receivables (RECT) scaled by assets
(AT);
foreign pre-tax income (PIFO) divided by pre-tax income (PI) which
is set to zero if there is no revenue from foreign operation;
the ratio of current assets (ACT) to total assets (AT);
the ratio of current assets (less inventories ACT-INVT) to current
liabilities(LCT);
net income before extraordinary items (IB) divided by lagged total
assets(AT);
total long-term debt (DLTT) scaled by average total assets;
1 if net income (NI) is negative, and otherwise 0;
1 if the client firm has internal control weaknesses in year t-1, and 0
otherwise;
1 if the auditor gave a going-concern opinion to a client in the fiscal
year, and 0 otherwise;
1 if the client’s fiscal year-end is not December 31st, and 0 otherwise;
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Appendix-Continued
Variable
BIG4

SECTIER
LIT

LNPROCEEDS
ATURN
ROALOSS
VC
PRESTIGE

O_SCORE

UNDERPRICING
RANK
REVISION
SPREAD
TECH
VWTOT
IPORET
IPOTOT
LNAGE
PROCEEDS

Definition
1 if a clients’ auditor is one of the Big 4 auditors, and 0 otherwise. At
the beginning of my sample time period (i.e. January 1, 2002), Arthur
Andersen still existed and the Big 4 at that time was the Big 5;
1 if a client’s auditor is either BDO Seidman LLP or Grant Thornton
LLP, 0 otherwise;
is an indicator variable which takes the value one if the company
operates in a high litigation industry (SIC codes of 2833–2836, 3570–
3577, 3600–3674, 5200–5961,and 7370–7374), and zero otherwise;
the natural log of IPO client’s proceeds;
total sales (SALE) divided by lagged assets (AT);
one if ROA is less than zero, and zero otherwise;
an indicator variable which equals 1 if the IPO is backed by venture
capital, and otherwise 0;
an indicator variable which takes 1 if the underwriter for the IPO has
a modified Carter Manaster Rank of 9.1 (Carter and Manaster 1990;
Loughran and Ritter 2004; Ertimur et al. 2014) and 0 otherwise;
-1.32-0.407(Log of Total Assets (AT)) +6.03(Total Liabilities
(LT)/Total Assets (AT))-1.43(Working Capital (ACT-LCT) /Total
Assets (AT))-0.076(Current Liabilities (LCT) /Current Assets
(ACT))-1.72(1 if Total Liabilities (LT) > Total Assets (AT), and 0
otherwise)-0.521(Net Income(t)-Net Income(t-1))/(|Net Income(t) ||Net Income(t-1) |);
the difference between first-day closing price and offer price divided
by offer price;
the reputation of underwriters using the updated Carter-Manaster
ranking (Carter and Manaster,1990) available on Jay Ritter’s website;
the percentage price revision from midpoint of initial filing range to
the offer price;
underwriters’ fees calculated as the total underwriting/ management/
selling fees as a percentage of the amount offered in the IPO;
an indicator variable that equals one for technology firms defined
using the four-digit SIC codes in Cliff and Denis(2004);
the sum of the value weighted market return for the two months prior
to the IPO;
the average IPO first-day return during the two months prior to a
firm’s IPO month available on Jay Ritter’s website;
the total number of IPOs over the two months prior to a firm’s IPO
month available on Jay Ritter’s website;
the natural log of IPO firm Age defined as the year of the IPO minus
the year of founding available on Jay Ritter’s website;
the log of IPO proceeds in millions, divided by CPI.
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